Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Boeing’s future depends on FAA approvals May 26, 2025
- Department of Justice, Boeing OK to Non-Prosecution Agreement May 23, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 23. May 23, 2025
- Services are driving revenues and profits in difficult times, Part II May 22, 2025
- Boeing publicizes fourth Chief Aerospace Safety Officer Report May 21, 2025
Boeing charges, costs nearly $35bn since 1996
By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Nov. 5, 2019, © Leeham News: Boeing already has racked up $9.2bn in one-time charges and additional costs to the accounting block in the 737 MAX crisis.
Some expect there will be more substantial charges before the dust settles. Even Boeing officials said it will be years before all customer claims are settled. Legal liabilities are only partially covered by insurance.
Program accounting, which is unique to the US, allows a company to spread the costs of an expensive development over the anticipated life of the program and the forecasted orders.
Other countries require unit accounting or charging off costs as they occur during development.
Boeing is one of few companies in the US to use program accounting. This masks current charges in the GAAP-approved financial statements. A few years ago, Boeing also began reporting non-GAAP numbers on the basis of unit costs as additional information.
With one-time charges and added costs to program accounting assumptions related to the 737 MAX grounding, Boeing’s accounting policies are back in the spotlight. The accounting policy became controversial as deferred production costs spiked on the 787 program.
As commercial and defense programs faced cost overruns and delays, the company had to record billions of US Dollars in charges and various losses over the years.
LNA went through all of Boeing’s annual 10-K filings since 1996 to identify all the charges recorded on commercial and defense programs.
After recording billions in charges since Dennis Muilenburg became CEO in 2016, we assess whether there is more to come in future quarters.
Summary
- Program Accounting fundamentals;
- Dreamliner Deferred production cost controversy;
- Billions in (not so) one-off charges;
- Current and future charges under Muilenburg’s watch.
Big Three Gulf Carriers’ financials
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Nov. 4, 2019, © Leeham News: The rise of the Big Three Middle Eastern carriers since the mid-2000s has been nothing short of astounding.
They took full advantage of an advantageous geographical location: 85% of the world population is within a 10-hour flight from either Qatar or the UAE. Emirates and Qatar Airways connect all continents, except Antarctica.
This transformation i
nto super connectors did not come without controversies. The most vocal are the Big Three US legacy carriers, through the Partnership for Open and Fair Skies. They accuse the Gulf Carriers of benefiting from massive subsidies that allow them to underprice their competitors.
As part of a deal between Qatar, the UAE, and the USA, the Big Three Gulf Carrier started publishing audited financial statements. Emirates’ and Qatar Airways’ financial statements are publicly available on their websites since 1994 and 2015, respectively. Etihad Airways has been releasing some income statement information since 2010.
Ahead of the upcoming Dubai Air Show Nov. 18-19, LNA had a look at those financial statements. We outline our takeaways in this article.
Summary
- Very high growth at all three airlines;
- Funded by different means;
- Global slowdown and Geopolitical tensions force strategy rethink;
- Varying levels of earnings quality;
- An unsuspected (significant) source of revenues.
Pontifications: Congressional hearings on Boeing dominated by grandstanding–but damning documents revealed
By Scott Hamilton
- Senate hearing largely theater.
- House hearing has grandstanding, but substance, too.
- House reveals some damning documents.
- Muilenburg claims no knowledge of legal strategy, but top lawyer reports directly to him.
Nov. 4, 2019, © Leeham News: Last week’s Congressional hearings about the Boeing 737 MAX crisis was just as I expected: theatre, lots of grandstanding, little substance and testimony that elicited little in the way of new information.
The US Senate hearing was a perfect example of playing to the television by many Senators.
The House hearing certainly had its share, but in more lucid moments, some House members produced new documents that were especially damning to Boeing.
Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg and John Hamilton, VP and chief engineer, did no harm to Boeing, which was probably the prime objective. (Hamilton is no relation to me.)
Muilenburg did harm to himself, however, and some Members of Congress landed some damning blows.
A Basic “MCAS” System was installed in the Boeing 707 in the 1960s
By Oliver Stuart Menteth
Fintech Aviation Services
Special to Leeham News
Oliver Stuart Menteth
Nov. 1, 2019, © Leeham News: It was simplistic in design, had a graduated and limited input into the pitch control system and details were included in the relevant training, operational and maintenance manuals. It worked seamlessly and because of this its existence, and reason for installation, has eluded most people in the industry. The system was installed not as a result of a recommendation or regulation imposed by the FAA but at the insistence of the Air Registration Board (now the Civil Aviation Authority) of the United Kingdom.
But first, some relevant background.
Bjorn’s Corner: Analysing the Lion Air 737 MAX crash, Part 1.
By Bjorn Fehrm
November 1, 2019, ©. Leeham News: We start the series on analyzing the Lion Air 737 MAX crash by looking at what went wrong in the aircraft. It’s important to understand MCAS is not part of what went wrong. It worked as designed during all seven Lion Air flights we will analyze in this series.
It was a single sensor giving a faulty value that was wrong with these aircraft. How a single faulty sensor could get MCAS to doom the JT610 flight (called LNI610 in the report) is something we look into later in the series. Now we focus on why the sensor came to give a faulty value for five out of seven Lion Air flights and how these flights could be exposed to two different sensor faults.
One year after Lion Air crash, what’s the MAX’s future in Asia?
By Judson Rollins
Oct. 31, 2019, © Leeham News: One year ago this week, Lion Air flight JT610 went down in the Java Sea near Jakarta. It was the first of two accidents that would expose catastrophic design problems with the 737 MAX – and a regulatory relationship between Boeing and the FAA that had become too close to comfort.
Although much has been written about the US major carriers’ orders for the MAX, relatively little has been said about orders from the Eastern Hemisphere. Prior to the MAX’s grounding, 136 airplanes had been delivered to the region and another 1,186 were on firm order. This comprises nearly 27% of Boeing’s firm MAX orders.
The following table shows the top MAX operators in Asia & Australasia:
Is reengining the Boeing 767 a good idea? Part 3.
By Bjorn Fehrm
Subscription Required
Introduction
October 31, 2019, © Leeham News: We have looked into what a reengining of the 767 with GE GEnx engines would give over the last two weeks. FlightGlobal wrote Boeing considers reengining the 767-400ER with the GEnx engine to produce a new freighter and perhaps a replacement for the NMA project.
We analyzed the aircraft fundamentals in Part 1, then passenger and cargo capacities in Part 2 and now we finish with the economics of different possible variants compared with the standard 767 and a possible NMA.
Summary:
- The economic improvement of a GEnx reengined 767 is hampered by the new engine’s larger size and higher weight.
- After catering for the increased empty weight and drag of a reengined 767, the result puts the project in question.
- A reengined 767 is far from a replacement for the NMA.
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Faury looks to transform Airbus
- Guillaume Faury has been the chief executive officer of Airbus Group since April 1. In this exclusive interview, he looks back on his first six months and ahead for the future of the company. This is part 1 of two parts. Part 2 will appear soon.
Guillaume Faury
Oct. 30, 2019, © Leeham News: Guillaume Faury assumed his office as chief executive officer of the Airbus Group at a time when the company was trying to emerge from years-long scandals over bribery and corruption probes and the industry was only beginning to reel from the grounding of the Boeing 737 MAX.
Now, he’s focused on guiding Airbus in the future through a series of transformations to put the scandals behind the company, change production for the future and prepare for new airplanes that inevitably must be designed.
Becoming CEO
Faury’s been with Airbus for 20 years, surrounding a four-year stint with Peugeot from 2009-2013 as EVPO of Research and Development. He was named president of Airbus Commercial in February 2018. He previously was president and CEO of Airbus Helicopters from 2013-2018.
He succeeded CEO Tom Enders, who was not going to be given another term as part of the fallout of the numerous government investigations into past practices at Airbus involving third parties for aircraft sales, bribery and corruption allegations.
This advertisement is sponsored by Aviation Forum.
Although Enders and CFO Harald Wilhelm initiated the probes and reported the problems to the governments, they along with many others had to go as Airbus tried to limit the damage.
Boeing’s Muilenburg opening statement to the US House
Dennis Muilenburg
Oct. 29, 2019: Having completed his appearance before the US Senate today, Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg will appear before the US House tomorrow.
Here is his opening statement: Opening Statement-10-30.
His appearance before the Senate was about as expected. Most Senators seemed more interested in their five minutes of TV time than trying to get at answers and determine a path forward.
Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) was an exception, as was Sen. John Tester (D-MT). Cruz, a former prosecutor, pressed Muilenburg on his ignorance of key documents and the lack of communication with key employees.
Congress is accountable in Boeing MAX crisis, too
By Scott Hamilton
Commentary
Dennis Muilenburg
When Boeing CEO Dennis Muilenburg appears before the US Senate today and the US House tomorrow, he needs to be sure the company owns up to its role in the Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines 737 MAX crashes.
The advance copy of the opening statement to the Senate, released yesterday, heads in this direction.
But if Congress truly wants to understand how 346 people died and certification of the MCAS and MAX evolved, it damn well better hold the Federal Aviation Administration accountable, too.
There is little doubt Congress will put Boeing and the FAA through the meat grinder.