March 21, 2016, © Leeham Co: My Pontifications for the last two weeks examined how the Airbus and Boeing messaging continues to do battle for the product line ups. Boeing continues to denigrate the Airbus widebody line and Airbus fighting back, using Boeing’s own tactics alleging a product gap.
Boeing claims then A330neo is “dead on arrival” and the Airbus widebody strategy is “a mess.” Neither claim holds up under scrutiny. Certainly there is some weakness in the Airbus line: the A330-200 sales slowed to a trickle and the A330neo, especially the -800, has yet to truly advance. The A380 struggles and the A350-1000 is slow—but after the initial, unique splurge of the 777X, sales of this airplane have been anemic, too.
Airbus points out the sales of the 787-8 have dried up. So have sales of the 777-300ER, in sharp contrast to the unexpectedly strong sales for the A330ceo—enough so that Airbus is taking the production rate back up, to 7/mo, from the previously announced reduction to 6/mo.
Here’s why the 787-8 has become a dying sub-type.
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
March. 21, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: There is quite a lot of talk about what a new aircraft program like Boeing’s Middle of the Market (MOM) would cost the airframe OEM to develop. Typical quotes are “it would cost them at least $10bn.” When saying this, the person implies this is the program’s load on the company’s liquidity for that aircraft program.
This is not correct and we will now go through why. It might be true that the development of the aircraft cost $10bn. But the trouble is, this is not the only cost that will hit the OEM for this aircraft program.
Cost that one normally does not think about when talking about new aircraft programs can double the cash burden on the OEM. Here’s why.
Summary:
18 March 2016, ©. Leeham Co: Last week we covered the early days of flight control when the pilot controlled the aircraft’s movable surfaces (called movables; e.g. stabilator, rudder, ailerons, spoilers…) without the involvement of computers.
We will now continue with more advanced control systems, all based on the electrical signalling of the intentions of the pilot to the movables. As the modern Fly-By-Wire (FBW) control systems modify the aircraft’s basic flying behaviour, we need to start with understanding what that behaviour is. Then we can understand how different FBW systems go about modifying these characteristics.
One could think that an aircraft is made to fly nice and stable, should the pilot take a few seconds and admire the view. Nothing could be further from reality. All normally stable aircraft which do not employ flight computers or autopilots to enhance the normal stability would go into a rather nasty dive after a while.
Why this is so and what is done to help the pilot in modern FBW systems is the subject of today’s and next week’s Corner.
Special Edition of Pontifications
Advancing EIS of the 777X
I’m somewhat bemused by all the fuss over the prospect of Boeing advancing the delivery of the 777X from early 2020 to late 2019. This has been the plan for more than a year. That’s what my sources have been telling me all this time.
It’s been the desire longer that that.
March 14, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Airbus is presenting a new edginess in the long-running war of words with Boeing, adopting a tactic Boeing has used for years to make its case.
The European manufacturer has never been shy about getting in its digs at Boeing, but generally Boeing’s messaging—years in the making and steadfastly adhered to—has had more sticking power than Airbus’.
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
March. 14, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: In three articles we have been looking at the new Russian single aisle aircraft, Irkut MC-21, from United Aircraft and the new Russian engine that is being developed for the aircraft, the PD-14.
The PD-14, which is offered as an alternative to the base engine for the aircraft, the Pratt & Whtiney PW1400G, was analysed in our Part 3 article. We now mount the engine on the MC-21 and explore the difference in performance compared to the base engine.
Summary:
11 March 2016, ©. Leeham Co: We covered a bit on flight testing some Corners ago and the fact that test pilots like to fly in direct Fly-By-Wire mode for initial evaluation of the aircraft. There’s a lot to say about how an aircraft is controlled. I have experienced the significant shift from mechanical flight controls to Fly-By-Wire (FBW).
For the pilot, things haven’t changed that much for normal flying with the introduction of FBW, but for the aircraft manufacturer it’s a dramatic change. It changes the way how one works to get an aircraft to fly nicely within its whole speed and altitude register (called the aircrafts flight envelope).
We will cover the reasons for the changeover to FBW for commercial aircraft and what this enables in a couple of Corners. We will start with how the classical mechanical flight control gradually got itself into more and more complication and how this was solved with FBW.
In a subsequent Corner, we will look at how FBW enable us to fly the aircraft differently. We can with the help of FBW implement more sophisticated flight control laws, aimed at helping the pilot to a safer flight.
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Introduction
Model design and paint by Camil Valiquette. Photo via Google.
March 10, 2016, © Leeham Co.: MOMentum for the Middle of the Market aircraft seems to be slowing from last year, as potential buyers and Boeing struggle to define an aircraft that would be affordable to build, affordable to buy and fulfill different mission requirements for capacity or range.
Meantime, Airbus is content to watch Boeing’s predicament, secure in what it believes is the winning strategy.
Summary
A330-800neo. Airbus rendering.
March 9, 2016, © Leeham Co.: The war of words between Airbus and Boeing at the ISTAT conference Feb. 29-March 1 wasn’t confined to which company sold more single-aisle airplanes. Widebody aircraft were involved, too.
A Boeing official on the sidelines of the conference called the Airbus A330neo “dead on arrival.” He says that by the time the 330neo enters service, there will be 1,000 787s and A350s in service and delivery slots will be closer in than they are today.
The airplane is nothing more than a resurrection of the original A350 concept that failed in the marketplace, this official said.
Rather than ask Airbus for what would be a predictable response, LNC asked lessor CIT Aerospace for its assessment. To be sure, CIT is not without vested interest: it was a launch customer for the A330neo and it’s a large customer for the A330ceo. Still, it provides a third-party assessment.