Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 21. May 9, 2025
- Does an A220-500 need a new wing and engines? Part 2. May 8, 2025
- Embraer downplays tariff impact on 2025 results May 6, 2025
- JetZero readies effort for private equity fund raising May 5, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 20. May 2, 2025
Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 3. Propulsive efficiency
By Bjorn Fehrm
April 12, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We have started an article series about engine development. The aim is to understand why engine development now dominates the new airliner development calendar time and the risks involved.
To understand why engine development has become a challenging task, we need to understand engine fundamentals and the technologies used for these fundamentals. We started last week with thrust generation, now we develop this to propulsive efficiency.
Figure 1. The base engine in our propulsive efficiency discussion, the CFM56-7 for the Boeing 737ng. Source: CFM.
A350-1000 or 777-9? Part 2
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By Bjorn Fehrm
April 10, 2024, © Leeham News: We are doing an article series comparing the capabilities of the Airbus A350-1000 and the Boeing 777-9. The A350-1000 has not been a hot seller, and a lot of analysts asked why. Is there a capability gap or what is the reason?
At the same time, the reworked Boeing 777X had reassuring initial sales at the November 2013 launch at the Dubai Air Show, where Emirates ordered 150 777-9 out of a total show orderbook of 259 aircraft for Emirates (150), Qatar (50), Lufthansa (34), and Ethiad (20). The orders have since grown to 481 as of late 2023.
The A350-1000 has had a recent resurgence in orders and switches from the A350-900 orders, whereas the 777–9 has seen several delays due to engine and certification problems and is now scheduled for 2025 delivery instead of 2020.
Does the 777-9 or the A350-1000 hold the upper hand in a long-term race between the largest widebodies after the Airbus A380 and Boeing 747-8i stopped deliveries? We use our Aircraft Performance and Cost model to compare the two to understand their present performance and potential for upgrades.
Summary:
- The Boeing 777-9 is a larger and heavier aircraft with a 12% higher passenger capacity.
- Does an advanced wing and later generation engines compensate for an older and heavier fuselage structure?
Pontifications: Boeing “transparency”–not so much.
By Scott Hamilton
April 9, 2024, © Leeham News: “Since [Aircraft Certification, Safety, and Accountability Act] ACSAA became law, Boeing has supported implementation of the legislation, including providing full transparency for the FAA’s expert review panel in its evaluation of our safety culture and other safety measures,” Boeing said in a statement responding to questions from The Seattle Times. “Over the past several years, we’ve taken a number of significant actions to strengthen our safety practices and culture. (Emphasis added.)
“We put safety and quality above all else, and continue to make significant changes to our culture, production and processes as we strive to improve.”
I couldn’t believe my eyes when I read this in the second major front page article by The Seattle Times dissecting how Boeing has become an industrial embarrassment.
Make no mistake. I want Boeing to be a healthy, thriving company. Commercial aviation needs a healthy Boeing to compete with a healthy Airbus. As a reporter and commentator, I want to balance the negatives with the positives. But since the 2018-2019 MAX crisis, there has been little positive to find about Boeing to write or say.
The reason I couldn’t believe my eyes with Boeing’s statement above, referring to the Federal Aviation Administration’s Expert Panel, is buried within the 50 page report. It also is at variance with decades of my experience, and that of other journalists, in dealing with Boeing.
Airbus charges and write-offs since 1999: more than €33bn
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By Scott Hamilton
April 8, 2024, © Leeham News: The A400M is Airbus’s biggest financial albatross when it comes to taking charges and write-offs, an analysis shows.
LNA last week reported Boeing’s long history of charges and write-offs that arguably hurt shareholder value in a company that’s placed this metric ahead of all others since the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas Corp. (MDC). Boeing has written off or taken charges of more than $73bn since 1996, the last year before the merger.
Airbus’ public records go back to 1999. Since then, the company wrote off more than €33bn (about $35bn using today’s exchange rate). This is about half of Boeing’s $70bn from 1999 through 2023.
The A400M military transport has been a financial thorn in Airbus’ side since inception. More than €10.5bn has been written off. Airbus’ other financial albatross, the A380, saw write-offs of €3.7bn.
Airbus’ infamous bribery scandal resulted in $4.2bn in European and US fines. Of this, $500m was paid to the US Justice Department for violating ITAR rules, which govern technology transfer to restricted governments such as China. (Notably, Boeing paid a criminal penalty fine of just $244m to Justice in connection with the two 737 MAX MCAS crashes in 2018 and 2019 in which 346 people died.)
The A350 program resulted in charges and write-offs totaling €2.57bn.
Airbus purchased Bombardier’s C Series for $1 for 50.1% control of the program. Airbus completed this purchase in 2018, taking a €2.6bn charge the same year for the purchase (and has invested billions of euros since then).
Below are two charts detailing the charges and write-offs. The first is by year and the second is by category.
Related Article
Boeing took +$73bn in charges since 1996
Airbus charges by category
Airbus charges and write-offs by year
Bjorn’ s Corner: New engine development. Part 2. Thrust generation
By Bjorn Fehrm
April 5, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We started an article series about engine development last week. The aim is to understand why engine development nowadays dominates the needed time and the risks involved in new aircraft development.
To understand why engine development has become perhaps the most challenging task, we need to understand engine fundamentals and the technologies used for these fundamentals. We start this week with thrust generation.
Figure 1. The principle for thrust generation using air as medium. Source: NASA.
Airbus’ A350-1000 or Boeing’s 777-9?
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By Bjorn Fehrm
April 4, 2024, © Leeham News: Korean Air confirmed an order for 33 Airbus A350 in the week, 27 of which are the larger A350-1000. The order is significant on two accounts:
First, 27 A350-1000 and only 6 A350-900, where analysts have for years asked why the -1000 isn’t selling.
Secondly, for a carrier that has a rather 50-50 fleet of Airbus and Boeing planes, its large widebody was the Boeing 777-300ER, whereof it has 27 out of 37 Boeing 777 in total. Korean Air now chooses the A350-1000 to replace the 777-300ER. Why not the 777-9?
Was this a question of availability (the 777-9 should have been delivered in 2020 but has had several delays; the present plan says 2025), or was there a technical-economic reason for Korean Air’s decision? We examine the characteristics of the two planes to find the answers.
Summary:
- The Boeing 777-300ER was an exceptionally successful stretch of the original 777-200. The 777-9 is the sequel to the 777-300ER.
- The market did not like the original A350-1000. Therefore, the present -1000 is a reconfigured aircraft compared to the original variant.
Boeing wrote off, took charges in excess of $70bn since McDonnell Douglas merger
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By Scott Hamilton
April 1, 2024, © Leeham News: The Boeing Co. wrote off or took forward loss charges of more than $70bn since the 1997 merger with McDonnell Douglas Corp. (MDC). That’s when most legacy Boeing employees and many observers view the inflection point when Boeing became focused on shareholder value vs the engineering legacy that once defined the company.
LNA has tracked Boeing’s charges and write-offs for years. We’ve also tracked Airbus’ performance since 1999 financial reporting. From then through 2023, Airbus took charges and forward losses of more than €33bn. At today’s exchange rate, this is about $35bn. During the same period, Boeing’s figure was more than $70bn, twice that of Airbus.
From 1997 through 2019, when Boeing suspended stock buybacks due to the first 737 MAX crisis, Boeing spent more than $60bn in stock buybacks to boost shareholder value, according to an analysis for LNA.
For a company focused for decades on shareholder value, the write-offs and charges is a lot of money out the door.
A detailed analysis reveals a surprising detail. More than half of Boeing’s charges and write-offs come from Boeing Commercial Airplanes–$44.66bn. More than $22bn was incurred since 2020, when the MAX crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic were in full swing.
In the charts below, LNA breaks down the charges and write-offs under each chief executive officer beginning with Phil Condit, the CEO who engineered the merger with MDC. Unsurprisingly, most of the charges came under current CEO David Calhoun and his predecessor, Dennis Muilenburg because of the MAX and the pandemic. Fixed price defense contracts also were major contributors. The KC-46A refueling tanker and Air Force One lead the way.
Bjorn’ s Corner: Engine development. Part 1. Introduction
March 29, 2024, ©. Leeham News: We finished our article series about New Aircraft Technologies last week. It dealt with the different new technologies that a next-generation airliner could use to increase efficiency and by it environmental emissions.
An area that we touched upon but didn’t dig deeper into was engine development. When airframe development historically decided how long a new generation of aircraft took to develop, it gradually changed to engine development being the more calendar-time-consuming and riskier development for the last generations. This article series will discuss why and what can be done about it.
Figure 1. CFM RISE, a new engine development for the next generation of airliners. Source: CFM.
When does a larger airliner pay off? Part 4
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By Bjorn Fehrm
March 28, 2024, © Leeham News: We are doing an article series about what drove the cross-over from Airbus A319 to A320 and then to A321. We analyzed the change from A319/A320ceo to neo last week and discussed why the neo shift for the A319 meant if stopped selling.
Now, we study the change from A321ceo to A321neo and what caused the acceleration of growth of A321 sales and deliveries as it was upgraded to neo.
Summary:
- The increase in sales and delivery of the A321 when it went from ceo to neo has less to do with improved operating economics than other factors.
- One of these factors was it filled the MOM (Middle Of the Market) gap that Boeing identified 10 years ago.
Select Boeing performance under David Calhoun
David Calhoun, president and CEO of The Boeing Co.
March 26, 2024, (c) Leeham News: For more than a quarter of a century, Boeing’s Board of Directors focused on stock price and shareholder value as the top priority for the company’s performance.
Jim McNerney was CEO from 2005-2015. The stock price peaked at about $149 during his tenure, never reaching the $200 per share goal allegedly set by the Board.
Dennis Muilenburg followed McNerney. The stock price peaked at about $422 under his leadership. Even after the second 737 MAX accident on March 10, 2019, and its global grounding three days later, the stock price remained about $320. Muilenburg was fired in December 2019 and David Calhoun assumed office the next month. Three months later, the COVID-19 pandemic erupted. Boeing’s stock price plummeted, along with the rest of the stock market for the next two years.
By Nov. 2, 2022, market recovery–and Boeing’s–was such that the company held its first analyst-investors day since 2018. During the event, Calhoun announced that Boeing would not “introduce” a new airplane until the middle of the next decade (ie, around 2035). Analysts loved it–stock shot up in the following week.
But Calhoun failed to right Boeing’s ship. Production, delivery delays, big write-offs, losses at the commercial and defense units, and finally safety concerns at commercial dominated his tenure to date.
On March 25, Boeing announced Calhoun will retire by the end of 2024. Chairman Larry Kellner will not stand for reelection to the Board. The CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, Stan Deal, retired effective immediately. Investors initially boosted Boeing’s stock price on the news, before falling back to the pre-announcement level.
How did Calhoun do during his tenure to date? Below are two charts: one reviews the stock price; the other reviews the write-offs and charges.