Pointifications: Wide-body orders; Bombardier’s $1bn

By Scott Hamiltn

By Scott Hamilton

Nov. 2, 2015, © Leeham Co. Boeing gets an order for up to 26 787-10s.

Airbus firms up options to an order for 30 A330s, added to 45 previously announced by the same customer.

Boeing announces an order for nine 787-9s.

For all the talk of a wide-body surplus, this is shaping up to be a good year for wide-body orders.

Through September, Airbus recorded 90 firm wide-body orders, all but three for the A330 family. Boeing recorded 152 during the same period (these are net figures). Not included are any of the orders listed above, which have yet to be recorded as firm contracts.

Based on the YTD-September figures and those above, Airbus has a 42% share of orders this year; Boeing has 58%.

Read more

What’s the trouble with Bombardier and the CSeries, Part2?

By Bjorn Fehrm

Subscription required.

Introduction

Nov. 02, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Bombardier (BBD) held its 3Q 2015 call last week and gave further information around the cash needed to bring the CSeries program to market. We now take the chance to compare our forecast of the program’s costs with the information that could be gleaned from the 3Q report and analyst call.

Overall, it can be said that OEM’s don’t want market analysts to have to detailed information. The answers on the analysts’ questions are as general as possible and one has to collect bits and pieces to build a picture. When doing this, it helps that one has modeled the whole problem beforehand. The OEM’s sparse data points can then be fitted like puzzle pieces into the larger picture and one can see if there is a fit or not.

Here is what we found.

Summary:

  • Overall, the communicated 3Q results and needs of the CSeries program fit well with our forecast.
  • BBD’s CEO, Alain Bellemare, said, however, on Canadian TV that Leeham’s forecast of a loss of $32m per aircraft for the first 50 “is not correct”.
  • With the data that was communicated we have to be close. There is a plausible explanation why we and Bellemare could both be correct; we explain why.

Read more

Airbus Group 3Q results; Increase of A320 production to 60 a month

By Bjorn Fehrm

Oct. 30, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Airbus Group announced its increase of the production rate for the best-selling A320 range to 60 a month in conjunction with its 3QAirbus_logo_3D_Blue 2015 results. The rate increase shall be seen against a backdrop of ever-increasing backlog for the A320neo, now at over 4,300 aircraft. The sales bonanza of the A320 is continuing with another 100 aircraft committed at Chancellor Merkel’s visit to China in October.

Airbus Group booked solid results for the third quarter, with order intake for Airbus for the year already secured in 3Q at 815 aircraft (791 3Q 2014). Noteworthy are the A330 bookings of 87 aircraft which have also continued in October with another 30 aircraft committed by China.

Revenue was up 6% to €43bn (€40bn 3Q 2014) and core operational EBIT was up 6.5% to €2.8bn  compared to €2.59bn 3Q 2014. Free Cash Flow (FCF) was better than 3Q 2014, with €-1.8bn instead of €-2.1bn4. Airbus group expect FCF to be breakeven for the year.

Given the strong results Airbus Group has decided to buy back €1bn of shares before June 2016.

Details from the Airbus programs are:

Read more

Bjorn’s Corner: Aircraft programs

By Bjorn Fehrm

By Bjorn Fehrm

30 October 2015, ©. Leeham Co: There has been dramatic news this week around Bombardier’s (BBD) CSeries program. I wrote a subscribers article about what to expect in terms of the cash flow problem that the BBD management has been wrestling with. The announcements yesterday and the following earnings call confirmed the financial modelling I did with our aircraft modelling tool.

Having watched experienced Wall Street analysts being hard pressed to understand what has happened with the CSeries, I thought I could use this week’s corner to explain the overall economical flow of an aircraft program like the CSeries (there will be details in a follow up subscriber article). I will also put it in context with how it affects a company like BBD and what one must think about when it comes to timing of such projects.

To give the timing aspect more colour, I will also compare with Embraer and their E-Jet E2 project and Boeing’s 787 program. The three programs are very different and they demonstrate in an illustrative way the challenges of making a new civil airliner and that one must adapt the project to the company’s position and its strength and weaknesses.

Read more

Bombardier 3Q2015 earnings call

Oct. 29, 2015: “I feel confident in our liquidity going forward,” following the investment by the Quebec government of $1bn in the CSeries program, says Alain

Alain Bellemare

Bellemare, president and CEO.

With that, Bombardier launched its third quarter earnings call.

Cancellation of the Learjet 85 program was due to a lack of sales due to a prolonged downturn in the business jet market, Bellemare said. The $3.2bn charge against the CSeries program was driven by delays. Bellemare said that production aircraft are moving down the production lines. “We’re getting traction with potential customers” with the new sales team. The partnership with the Quebec government “is excellent news.”

Key initiatives have been identified for cash savings over the next five years. More information will be forthcoming on November 24 at a New York investment conference.

Read more

Bombardier: $3.2bn charge, $1bn from Quebec

Oct. 29, 2015: Bombardier today announced a US$3.2bn charge against the CSeries program and a $1bn investment from the province of Quebec, about half of what

CS100: Certification 97% complete. Photo via Google images.

had been rumored, with its 3Q2015 earnings. The press release is here.

BBD also canceled its Learjet 85 program. Revenues declined $800m to $4.1bn. Exclusive of charges against the CSeries and Learjet programs, BBD reported net income of $71m vs $171m. Total reported net loss was $4.9bn, including the charges against the two programs.

“Today, we are proud to announce that the government of Québec will invest $1 billion in the C Series aircraft program. This partnership comes at a pivotal time, with the C Series on the verge of certification. The market is there, our leadership is in place, we have the best product and with the support of the government, we are ready to make this aircraft a commercial success,” said Alain Bellemare, president and CEO.

Read more

Northrop wins, Boeing/Lockheed lose bomber contract

Oct. 27, 2015: Northrop Grumman, builder of the B-2 bomber in the USAF inventory, was awarded the contract to build the next generation long-range bomber, which is yet to be named. For the moment, we’ll call it the “B-3.” For now it’s official name is the Long Range Strike Bomber (LRSB).

The Seattle Times has this story.

This is a big blow to Boeing, whose declining defense business was already in trouble from defense cutbacks and previous contract losses. The contract is worth $80bn.

Boeing’s strategy in acquiring McDonnell Douglas Corp back in 1997 was to even the revenue stream between commercial and military, in which Boeing then had a small portion and MDC was predominately military. Boeing was a sub-contractor to Northrop on the B-2, gaining a lot of its composite experience there which ultimately benefited development of the 787.

Unless Boeing finds grounds to challenge the contract award, prevails and wins a second competition, its Defense unit will continue to shrink.

Goldman Sachs, as with many other investment banks, called this a big win for Northrop.

Read more

Pontifications: Is the end in sight for program accounting?

By Scott Hamiltn

By Scott Hamilton

Oct. 26, 2015, © Leeham Co.: Is the end of program accounting, the staple of The Boeing Co. profit and loss reporting, on its way out?

It is in Europe, where it is called contract accounting, the end of its use is required by January 1, 2018. (LNC’s Bjorn Fehrm has talked about contract accounting in the past.) Companies have the option to eliminate it in 2017.

The fundamentals between contract and program accounting are similar: defer costs of the goods or services, and recognize profits sooner.

Europe’s International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) 15 says this has to stop.

Read more

What’s the trouble with Bombardier and the CSeries?

By Bjorn Fehrm

Subscription required.

Introduction

Oct. 26, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Bombardier (BBD) and the CSeries have been in the headlines for weeks. The CSeries development has taken longer than planned, with a cost overrun of approximately $2bn. But the company has $4.4bn in cash at end of 2Q 2015. So what is the trouble?

We go through the CSeries program and show the considerable additional cash burden that the start of production and deliveries is for an aircraft program like CSeries. We will get more data on the situation on the 29 October when Bombardier reports its 3Q results.

But it will not be necessary to wait until the 29th. It is rather straight forward to estimate the cash burden the CSeries program has on BBD with the data at hand. The program will burn through billions of cash even after certification and first delivery.

Summary:

  • We analyze the cash position of BBD with the contributors and consumers.
  • We also show the likely production costs of the CSeries aircraft during 2016 to 2018 and compare it to the net revenue that each delivered aircraft will bring.
  • We finally show what has triggered the recent activities around BBD and the CSeries.

Read more

Bjorn’s Corner: Increasing an aircraft’s range, further considerations

 

By Bjorn Fehrm

By Bjorn Fehrm

23 October 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In last week’s Corner, we went through how Airbus can offer an Ultra Long Haul (ULH) aircraft to Singapore Airlines by increasing the Maximum Take-Off Weight of its A350-900, increasing the tankage and lower the payload. There are a couple of other considerations when extending the range of an aircraft that we did not touch upon. For completeness, we go through them here.

When increasing the allowed weights (really, masses) of a certified airliner, there are a few things that need to be re-evaluated and perhaps modified. First of all, the airframe needs to withstand the higher loads caused by the higher weights. Secondly, the aircraft’s field performance will be affected by higher weights. Required take-off field length must stay within usable limits, as must landing performance.

If the increase in flying weights are significant, it will also require a check on what happens to the aircraft’s flight profile when fully loaded. A heavier aircraft will cruise at lower flight levels and the One Engine Inoperative (OEI) service ceiling will diminish.

We now go through these additional areas and evaluate their impact on overall aircraft performance in general and on an A350-900ULR in particular.

Read more