With the increasing possibility that Airbus will defer or even drop the A350-800, the case for an A330neo becomes much stronger. Absent the A358, Airbus has no effective competition to the Boeing 787-8. The current A330, which we will call the A330 Classic, is a very good airplane but it is not as fuel efficient as the 788. The Airbus argument that the A330 Classic is competitive is based on the most favorable of assumptions and rests in part on the key capital cost assumption and moderate fuel prices.
In a story on Friday Reuters confirmed our December 23 e-newsletter report (which subsequently was published at Leeham News and Comment December 29) that Airbus is seriously considering an A330neo. This certainly clears the air on this score.
Source: Airbus
Airbus argues that the lower capital cost offsets the higher operating costs of its A330s vs Boeing’s 787-8 and forthcoming 787-9.
The following table includes Airbus’ assumption as well as 2013 lease rates reported by the appraisal firm Collateral Verifications (CV). Airbus assumes a higher lease rate for the 787-8 than CV reports. CV does not yet have an estimated lease rate for the 787-9.
Current Market Value is the price an airplane can be expected to sell for in today’s environment. Current Base Value is the theoretical price in a stable supply-and-demand market.
We really hoped we were done with this story, but the saga of the IAM 751 Boeing 777X contract vote lives on.
The critics of the election’s timing note that several thousand members of 751 were on vacation on January 3. Absentee voting was allowed for the first time in IAM history, but according to media reports, about 2,700 members did not vote in this election who voted in the November 13 election. The 777X contract was rejected then by a 67%-33% margin.
If these 2,700 members voted in the January 3 election, about 72% of these would have had to vote “Reject” to overcome the 51% “Accept” result. This is 5 percentage points greater than the November 13 Reject vote. We’re not persuaded this would have occurred.
We were involved in local suburban and state legislative elections from 1998 through 2011. In the suburb where we live, voter turnout in presidential years routinely was 85%. We analyzed voting results and voting trends in all but the 2011 election. In no case did absentee votes alter the initial reported outcome by more than 1%. Those on the losing end hoped that absentee ballots would make up the difference. We always calculated what percentage of votes would be required to overcome a deficit. Super-majority percentages were beyond reach.
It is based on this experience, and the percentages achieved in the November 13 and January 3 votes, that leads us to conclude that even if the “missing” 2,700 members had cast votes, the required percentage to win–72%–was impossible to achieve.
We believe the contract still would have been accepted.
There are deeper, longer term implications for the January 3 vote by IAM 751 members on the revised contract proposal from Boeing than have been discussed in the public domain.
The near-term implications have been discussed ad nausea: for employees, vote for a contract that includes concessions, notably on pensions, or risk losing the assembly site for the 777X. For the states, Washington could be a winner, or a big loser. The state that’s awarded the assembly site would be a big winner. Suppliers will supply Boeing regardless of where the 777X is assembled.
Another near-term implication we’ve talked about: the fall-out on the IAM, both at the International level and the District 751 level. No matter how the vote turns out, there is a civil war within 751 members who are royally upset with their leadership and others who believe in it. The civil war between 751 and IAM International HQ will continue well beyond the vote, with the prospect that International could simply depose all the 751 leaders and place 751 under a trustee “for the good of the union.”
But there are much longer term implications of the vote.
Note: The following was distributed to our e-mail list December 23. Last week, American Airlines (as predicted) swapped the A350-800s for A350-900s.
The possibility of Airbus launching an A330 new engine option appears to be gaining ground.
Our Market Intelligence tells us that Airbus is considering a decision soon, probably next year, with a target entry-into-service date of 2018.
A decision to proceed with an A330neo would come after one to drop the A350-800, according to our information. Airbus has systematically switched -800 customers to the larger, and more profitable A350-900 and A350-1000. There are now just 79 A350-800s in backlog.
Customer |
Qty |
Comments |
Aeroflot |
8 |
|
Aircraft Purchase Fleet |
12 |
For Alitalia |
Asiana |
8 |
|
AWAS |
2 |
Probably will swap to A359 |
Hawaiian Airlines |
6 |
Waiting on US Airways |
ILFC |
6 |
Probably will swap to A359 |
Kingfisher |
5 |
Good as gone |
Libyan |
4 |
|
US Airways |
18 |
Expected to disappear now that AA merger completed, replaced with A359/A351 |
Yemenia |
10 |
|
Source: Airbus, Nov. 2013 |
79 |
Leeham Co Chart |
We identify 37, or 47%, that probably are already at risk of cancellation in favor of the larger A350-900 or A350-1000. These 37 are highlighted in red and pink. Another 10, those for Yemenia, are probably already iffy, according to Market Intelligence. The total of 47 represents 59% of the backlog. We have no information on the remaining customers’ intentions.
We obtained a copy of Boeing’s Request for Proposal documents. Much of the information contained therein has already been reported. You may link to these news articles here.
As with previous inquiries, Boeing spokesman Doug Alder declined to authenticate the RFP documents or to comment on the contents.
Boeing plans to announce its site selection decision soon into the new year.
We look at some key production and entry-into-service (EIS) issues today.
Site Selection
Boeing outlined three scenarios for site selection:
Scenario 1:
Wing Fabrication & Assembly, Body Assembly, Final Assembly & Delivery
Start of facility construction no later than November 2014
Production start July 2016
Scenario 2A:
Wing Fabrication & Assembly
Start of facility construction no later than November 2014
Production start July 2016
Scenario 2B:
Body Assembly, Final Assembly & Delivery
Start of facility construction no later than June 2015
Production start January 2018
EIS
EIS is promised for 2020. Boeing hasn’t been specific about when within 2020 this is planned, but Market Intelligence initially had EIS pegged for December 2019, based on previous Boeing representations to potential customers. For our purposes, we’ll assume EIS in mid-2020.
Design Timeline
Wind tunnel testing began December 5 in Farnborough, England.
Based on the proposed EIS of 2020 and the historical design-to-EIS timelines, we estimate roll-out of the first test airplane and flight tests will be in 2018.
Boeing 777X Timeline |
||
2013 |
Offer, first orders |
Wind Tunnel Testing begins |
2014 |
Site selection; facility construction begins Nov or…(see 2015) |
‘Top Level’ Design |
2015 |
Facility construction begins June |
Firm configuration |
2016 |
Production begins in July; or…(see 2018) |
|
2017 |
|
|
2018 |
Production begins in January |
Roll out, flight tests begin |
2019 |
|
|
2020 |
|
777-9X EIS |
2021 |
|
|
2022 |
|
777-8X EIS |
Sources: Boeing 777X RFP; Leeham Co. Estimates |
Production
According to the RFP, production is to begin in July 2016 or January 2018, depending on the site selection scenario chosen. The RFP raises an interesting question:
“Production” is undefined in the RFP but typically this means components, not just final assembly. Given a 2020 EIS, it seems that Scenarios 1 and 2A are more likely than Scenario 2B. But it all depends on how “production” is ultimately defined by Boeing.
According to the RFP, the facilities need to have a production capacity of 10.4 aircraft a month. The 777 Classic is currently being produced at a rate of 8.3/mo, although Boeing is known to have studied a rate of at least 9/mo.
Market Launch
Boeing officially launched the program at the Dubai Air Show with 225 orders from Emirates Airlines, Etihad Airlines and Qatar Airways. Lufthansa Airlines placed the first order prior to the show. Program orders now stand at 295. Forty-three of these were for the ultra-long range 777-8X, which can fly 9,400nm. We previously discussed the market potential for the ULR, which historically has been highly limited.
The 777-9 is, of course, in a class by itself at 406 seats. It’s larger than the current 777-300ER (365 seats), the Airbus A350-1000 (350-369 seats) and smaller than the Boeing 747-8 (advertised 467 seats) and Airbus A380 (525 seats). The question is whether Airbus will respond to the 777-9 or leave Boeing to this market segment.
We believe Airbus should proceed with a stretch of the -1000, commonly dubbed the -1100, that would be a straight-forward stretch using the same engines and wing. This would reduce the range of the -1000 by an estimate 1,200-1,500nm but the resulting 6,500-7,000nm range would cover 90% of the routes operated by airlines. This is the approach Boeing took with the 787-10. Furthermore, the Middle Eastern airlines have spoken with their orders for the 777X.
Is there enough market left for two airplanes in the 400 seat sector? Airbus, according to our Market Intelligence, doesn’t appear to think so. Current thinking appears to be that Boeing can have this narrow niche and Airbus will continue to pursue the narrow niche of the Very Large Aircraft (into which the 777-9 technically and barely falls) with the A380. Airbus believes the future of the 747-8I is dim and we agree. Thus, the large twin and VLA market appears to be shaping up like this:
Seats |
Airbus |
Boeing |
300-350 |
A350-900 |
787-10 |
350-370 |
A350-1000 |
777-8 |
370-410 |
None |
777-9 |
410-Up |
A380 |
747-8I* |
* Likely discontinued ~2020 |
|
|
Leeham Co. Chart |
|
|
Airbus has had trouble throughout its existence with its wide-body strategy. The A300, its first airplane and the first twin-engine, twin-aisle airplane, was a mediocre design and performer. The A330/340 line was originally a medium range pair that didn’t truly find favor until the A330 range was increased in recent years to more than 5,000-6,000nm. The A340 sold fewer than 400 and was easily eclipsed by the 777, particularly the 777-300ER.
AirAsiaX orders A330-300s: As forecast earlier this week, the budget carrier ordered 25 Airbus A330-300s. According to reports, AirAsiaX may not be done. Group CEO Tony Fernandes wants Airbus to develop an A330neo. Stay tuned.
Washington State and Airbus: The Associated Press wrote a story about the courtship of Washington State of Airbus, making a link between the Boeing 777X site selection Schizophrenia and the Airbus effort. Some headline writers made an even more direct cause-and-effect link. This vastly overstates what’s been going on. Gov. Christine Gregoire began reaching out to Airbus in 2010, but the effort was stalled by the then-contentious and bitter competition between Boeing and Airbus over the USAF KC-X tanker competition. Gregoire, who was just named chairman of the advisory committee to the US Export-Import Bank, naturally backed the Boeing bid but was wisely measured in her rhetoric when it came to the EADS KC-330 offering. The Washington Congressional delegation, however, was often vitriolic and as a result, Gregoire’s efforts largely stalled.
Once that competition was over in 2011, Gregoire resumed her efforts in the last year of her governorship, meeting with EADS and Airbus officials at the 2012 Farnborough Air Show. The WA Dept. of Commerce had continued efforts throughout. This past summer, Commerce and the Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance hosted an Airbus suppliers meeting in the Seattle area, attended by about 120 suppliers (about 30-40 had been expected).
So while the AP story is factually correct overall, any linkage to 777X and the Airbus courtship is overstated. This has been a long-term effort by Airbus, PNAA and it is a concept we called for in October 2009 in a speech before the Governor’s Aerospace Summit just days before Boeing announced it was locating 787 line 2 in Charleston (SC). The Airbus effort, if anything, has more of a link to that event than to the 777X.
Boeing names Muilenberg COO: Dennis Muilenberg, CEO of Boeing’s defense business, has been named COO of The Boeing Co. He is succeeded by Christopher Chadwick. Ray Conner, CEO of Boeing Commercial Airplanes, was named Vice Chairman of the Board and continues in his current position. The press release is here.
McNerney reaches retirement age next year but given the timing, we think he’ll stick around a bit longer to give Muilenberg more time in the #2 corporate position. Since Muilenberg is younger than Conner, we think Muilenberg is the more likely choice for successor.
Another Day, Another 777X story: The obsession continues. Seattle Times columnist Danny Westneat has this commentary worth reading. The Everett Herald has a good wrap up of where things stand in Washington State right now. The Seattle Times looks at Long Beach (CA) in depth and its potential for the 777X.