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By Bjorn Fehrm
September 24, 2020, © Leeham News: Airbus was disturbed for decades by Boeing’s rein of the Very Large Aircraft (VLA) airliner segment with the 747. It was determined Boeing used this dominance to outmaneuver Airbus in different situations.
Airbus needed an aircraft in this market segment, bigger and better than Boeing’s. The result was the A380, the world’s largest passenger aircraft. We know how this developed today, where the COVID pandemic finally killed the segment for Very Large Aircraft. But how good was it, and where were the weaknesses?
We compare the A380, 747-8i, and Boeing’s up and coming 777-9 to find out.
By Bjorn Fehrm
September 21, 2020, © Leeham News: Airbus held a webcast today, announcing three zero-emission airliner concepts called the ZEROe line (Figure 1). The two conventional designs, the turbofan airliner and the turboprop use hydrogen as the fuel for their gas turbine engines. The blended wing-body is a more futuristic concept where propulsion technology was not specified.
The idea is to use these concepts as work paths to explore the technologies around them and their aerodynamic characteristics. The concepts “are not products” underlined Airbus EVP development Jean-Brice Dumont. “It’s rather examples of designs around which the technologies can be explored and results compared. After concepts follow demonstrators and then products.”
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By Judson Rollins, Bjorn Fehrm & Scott Hamilton
Sept. 21, 2020, © Leeham News: Commercial aviation is facing a lost decade due to COVID.
Yes, most forecasts target 2024-2025 as returning to 2019 passenger traffic and aircraft production levels.
However, LNA in July published its own analysis indicating full recovery may not occur until 2028. Breathless headlines notwithstanding, it will take years for vaccines to be widely available and considered safe by enough of the world’s population. Growing concern about vaccine production and distribution capacity through 2024 underscores this view. Even Southwest Airlines CEO Gary Kelly said earlier this month that business travel might not fully return for a decade.
Indeed, the 2020s may well be a lost decade for aircraft manufacturers and their supply chains.
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Sep. 17th, 2020, © Leeham News: Last week, we compared the economics of the A340-600 and the 777-300ER on the Los Angeles to Shanghai route. We now turn our attention to the last major bet on a quad-engine aircraft, Airbus’ Superjumbo A380.
By the Leeham News Staff
Sept. 15, 2020, © Leeham News: Boeing has removed hundreds of 737 MAX orders from its order book. While some were direct cancellations from customers, most came through ASC 606 adjustments.
Airbus does not publish such order adjustments by aircraft program in its monthly order and deliveries report. The European OEM publishes a total outstanding amount of contracts for commercial aircraft in its annual reports. However, the figure does not have a breakdown by program.
As a result, Airbus and Boeing order books aren’t an apple to apple comparison. The COVID-induced traffic slump has had a significant impact on airlines’ financial situation. Therefore, adjusting order books is necessary to assess an aircraft program’s backlog situation.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
September 10, 2020, © Leeham News: The Airbus A340-600 was designed to challenge Boeing’s hold of the large, long-haul jets. With a capacity 60 seats above the previous largest Airbus jet, the A340-300, and a 7,500nm range, it should put Airbus firmly on the long-haul map.
The A340-600 would be flying its 350 passengers as long and for a lower cost than the 20 seats larger Boeing 747-400, the then-largest long-haul Boeing jet. It would have worked hadn’t Boeing upgraded the 777-300 to the 777-300ER and surpassed the spec. How much better did that make the 777-300ER when it arrived in 2004?
By the Leeham News Staff
Sept. 9, 2020, © Leeham News: Morgan Stanley has a new aerospace analyst, Kristine Liwag, who initiated coverage on a half dozen companies over two days last week.
Among them, of course, was Boeing.
One of the conclusions in one of her notes:
“Assuming that some orders for growth and those ordered by lessors are cancelled in the 2020-2025 timeframe, we estimate that there is $73bn downside risk to Boeing’s revenue from 2020-2025. We note that our Bull case scenario assumes that the entire current order book converts to revenue.”
Liwag and her team also write, “there is an underappreciated risk that Boeing is particularly vulnerable to cancellations as the 737 MAX grounding (March 2019) opened up cancellation rights (without penalty) for aircraft deliveries that were delayed a year.”
But Morgan Stanley doesn’t let Airbus off the hook
“Boeing and Airbus manufacture aircraft to an order book. White tails, which are aircraft without owners, are uncommon and undesired. When demand is strong and the production skyline is sold out, as we have seen in the past few years, a new aircraft is a scarce commodity that airlines and lessors want. In times of uncertainty, a new aircraft, with a capital cost of $50mn-$200mn per unit, becomes a white elephant.”
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Sep. 3rd, 2020, © Leeham News: Last week, we compared the economics of the A340-300 and the 777-200ER on the Paris to San Francisco route. We now turn our attention to Airbus’ larger long-range aircraft, the A340-600.
The 30% larger A340-600 was developed in the last year of the 1990s to compete with Boeing’s 777-300ER, then in development.
By Scott Hamilton
Sept. 2, 2020, © Leeham News: Boeing is considering production changes to the slow-selling 787-8 to lower costs and boost sales.
The effort comes at a time when global passenger traffic is at record lows and recovery of international traffic is forecast to take four or five years.
As airline traffic recovers, carriers appear to be favoring smaller aircraft in restarting suspended routes.
In recent years, Boeing discouraged sales of the 787-8 because it is a low margin airplane with high production costs. This is a legacy of the program and development difficulties from 2004-2011, when it finally entered service.
The 787-9 and 787-10 are high margin aircraft Boeing counted on to reduce the billions of dollars in deferred production and tooling costs. At one time, this exceeded $32bn.
The early program difficulties resulted in the production and parts of the -8 to be substantially different than the -9/10, which have 95% commonality. The -8 was only 30% common.