Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Boeing, once the king of freighters, falls behind Airbus going forward
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By Scott Hamilton and Bjorn Fehrm
April 2, 2026, © Leeham News: Boeing is no longer “freighter king.”
The March 16 order by cargo carrier Atlas Air for 20 A350Fs gives Airbus a 60% market share of orders for the next generation of freighters. Since the dawn of the jet age, Boeing has had a lock on jet airliner freighters. It vanquished Douglas Aircraft Co and its successor, McDonnell Douglas. Airbus had modest success with the new build A300-600F, with about 100 ordered. But Airbus bombed with the new production A330-200F; only 38 were sold.
Figure 1. The backlog of new generation freighter orders gives Airbus a 60% market share. Sources: Airbus, Boeing.
However, Airbus now has 101 orders for the A350F. Boeing has just 68 for the competing 777-8F. This is a far cry from the 359 777F Classics, based on the 777-200LR, that have been ordered. There are 47 in the backlog. Production will conclude at the end of next year due to emissions standards that the old generation 777F does not meet. Boeing asked the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) for an exemption to build 35 more. It requested a decision by May 1.
Figure 2. Boeing dominated the jet freighter market from the 1960s. The recent, old generation freighter market was still overwhelmingly owned by Boeing. Sources: Airbus, Boeing.
Additionally, Boeing sold 288 767-300ERFs. There are 18 in the backlog. Production concludes at the end of next year.
How did Boeing lose its overwhelming dominance in the freighter market? How did Airbus overtake Boeing, as it did in the early 2000s in the passenger airplane arena?
The answers about Boeing rest in a combination of negative fallout from the 737 MAX crisis, a suspension of production of the 787, shifting priorities and Boeing’s inbred arrogance.
For Airbus, the answer lies in the tortoise-and-hare analogy and a willingness to listen to potential customers more than Boeing did in key campaigns.
Boeing’s Starliner history shows safety, quality concerns exist systemically across the company
Editor’s Note: The National Aeronautics and Space Agency (NASA) on Feb. 19 released its investigative report of the failures in 2024 of the Boeing Starliner space vehicle. Defects in the Starliner resulted in its crew being housed in the International Space Station for nine months before being returned to earth in a SpaceX capsule.
Boeing Starliner, docked at the International Space Station. Source: Boeing.
The investigation into the failures faulted NASA and Boeing. The 311 page report was triggered by the Starliner incident, and examines the NASA-Boeing Defense, Space and Security (BDS) cultures that led to the Starliner problems. The Boeing Co. is engaged in high profile efforts to change the culture at Boeing Commercial Airplanes (BCA). The Starliner incidents reveal similar cultural and safety issues at BDS that corporate CEO Kelly Ortberg must address.
The NASA report may be downloaded here: nasa-Starliner report 021926
In this Special Report, LNA dissects the NASA study. The shortcomings at BDS are eerily similar to those at BCA.
Special Report
By the Leeham News Team
Three Disasters
Lion Air and Ethiopian Airlines
The first Boeing 737-8 delivered, in May 2017, which happened to be to Lion Air. Source: Leeham News.
March 30, 2026, (c) Leeham News: On Oct. 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610—a Boeing 737 MAX 8—crashed into the Java Sea, killing all 189 aboard. The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS), a flight control system that Boeing had withheld information about from airlines and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)—including its existence and how it works—drove the aircraft into an unrecoverable dive.
The pilots had never been trained on it because Boeing determined that disclosing MCAS would require simulator training, which would make the MAX less competitive against the Airbus A320neo. Southwest Airlines, for example, which ordered hundreds of MAXes, required Boeing to pay $1m per airplane if simulator training was required.
Less than five months later, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed under virtually identical circumstances. It was another MAX 8 with another MCAS-driven dive. Another 157 people were killed. Combined death toll: 346 passengers and crew, plus one recovery diver in the Lion Air accident. The global fleet was grounded for 21 months.
Congressional investigations revealed what investigators called Boeing’s “culture of concealment” and the FAA’s systematic overreliance on Boeing’s Organization Designation Authorization (ODA) for self-certification. While federal government agencies routinely designate company employees to represent the overseeing agencies, the level of the FAA’s hand-off to Boeing came under withering criticism.
Following the long recovery period, the FAA clamped down on Boeing’s production of the 737 and to a lesser extent (and for different reasons), production of the 787. By late 2022, Boeing executives appeared confident that BCA was on the path to normal operations.
The state of alternative propulsion aircraft? Part 9.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
March 26, 2026, © Leeham News: In our series on the state of alternative propulsion projects, we are looking at different hydrogen-fueled propulsion systems.
Hydrogen can be processed chemically in a fuel cell to produce electrical power, which is then coupled to an electrical propulsion system, such as in hybrids or battery-electric aircraft. The advantage is that the system eliminates inefficient batteries that kill these systems.
Figure 1. The 100-seat fuel cell airliner is now Airbus’ ZEROe alternative. Source: Airbus.
The other alternative is to burn hydrogen in a gas turbine’s combustor. The advantage is that we keep the high power-to-mass ratio of a gas turbine, but with a heavier, more complicated fuel system, and use a lighter fuel than Jet Fuel/SAF.
We first dive deeper into the fuel cell-based variant.
Commercial Engine OEM: Not for the faint of heart. Or the cash-poor.
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By Karl Sinclair
Updated with March 20, 2026, oil prices.
March 23, 2026, © Leeham News: Airlines and lessors around the world are clamouring for their aircraft, which have been ordered and scheduled for delivery years in advance.
As the Trump Administration begins to cobble together an economic plan to combat rising oil prices due to the Iran war, this is especially true in the narrow-body segment, where fuel-efficient aircraft are badly needed.
The IATA fuel price monitor has jet fuel selling at $197/bbl for the week ending March 20, 2026, which applies more pressure on OEMs to deliver aircraft to customers. This is up from a low of $93 a barrel just five weeks prior.
Source: IATA.
While both aircraft manufacturing behemoths, Airbus (AB) and Boeing (BA), struggled to meet their respective master production schedules, one common thread emerges that affects both in the same manner:
Engine makers cannot keep up, even in the best of times.
Across the globe, all the engine producers face their own supply-chain and technology issues. It does not matter if the producer is North American-based, European, or Asian.
Powerplants are a tricky proposition, even for the most established engine-maker.
This begs the question:
Why doesn’t someone new enter the market and pick up the slack in production? If not someone new, how about a current aviation industry corporation, with an installed engineering base, who can invest and transition into commercial engines?
The state of alternative propulsion aircraft? Part 8.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
March 19, 2026, © Leeham News: In our series on the state of alternative propulsion projects, we have analysed electric hybrid projects and found that these do not make for an operationally acceptable airliner. They are more expensive in production, thus in purchase, and their operational costs are not lower than the aircraft they shall replace.
Projects analyze hybrids after realizing that battery-electric airliners are too limited in range. But soon, the problem areas of hybrids become clear. The studies then swing to hydrogen propulsion systems.
Figure 1. The Airbus ZEROe hydrogen-fueled concepts for a future airliner. Source: Airbus.
These have new technical challenges but produce aircraft with operationally acceptable range. We now examine the various concepts for hydrogen-fueled propulsion and outline their challenges and capabilities.
Change Incorporation, Configuration Control, and the High Cost of Getting It Wrong
Editor’s note: Boeing spent years doing rework on the 737 MAX and the 787 after the former’s grounding following two fatal crashes and the latter’s production flaws. “Shadow factories” began the 737’s rework after the 21-month grounding was terminated in November 2020. The last of 450 airplanes was delivered in 2025. Deliveries of the 787 were suspended in October 2020; 110 aircraft needed rework. The last of this inventory was cleared in 2025. This work is also known as “Change Incorporation.” Thirty-five 737 MAX 7s and 10s have been built and await certification, which idepends on design changes that must be retrofitted once the Federal Aviation Administration signs off. Change incorporation took 3-4 months for the 787s and was measured in months for the 737s.
More than 30 777-9s have been built while this program awaits FAA certification. This, too, will require Change Incorporation. Boeing has not revealed what changes the FAA will require, although revised flight control software is known to be one element. Nor has Boeing revealed how long Change Incorporation for the 777-9s will take.
LNA’s news team explains what Change Incorporation is, how it is undertaken, and the implications for the 777-9s in inventory.
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By the Leeham News Team
March 18, 2026, © Leeham News: In the commercial aviation industry, building aircraft before the type certificate is formally issued is not unusual. It is an economic necessity.
Undelivered Boeing 777-9s (among other aircraft) are lined up in open-air storage in this undated 2025 Google Earth photo of Paine Field, Everett (WA). The 777s are the “green” airplanes, though more are also painted in other colors.
Launching a production line months or years before final regulatory approval allows manufacturers to meet early delivery commitments, recoup development investment more quickly, and maintain customer relationships. But this strategy carries a profound and often underestimated technical liability: when the approved design specification continues to evolve through flight test, the already-built airframes must be brought into conformance with the final certified configuration. This is the essence of the Change Incorporation process.
The Boeing 777X program offers the most current illustration of this challenge. As of early 2026, Boeing has assembled more than 30 777-9 airframes, all built to early-production standards, while the aircraft’s type certificate is still in progress.
At the same time, the January 2024 in-flight separation of a door plug from Alaska Airlines Flight 1282—an event traceable directly to failures in Boeing’s parts removal and reinstallation process—has thrown the Change Incorporation process into the spotlight.
These two stories are connected by a single systemic thread: the consequences of inadequate configuration discipline in a complex, multi-stakeholder manufacturing environment.
Air Lease merger this year creates new lessor powerhouse
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By Karl Sinclair
March 16, 2026, © Leeham News: Aircraft lessor giant Air Lease Corporation (ALC) of Los Angeles (CA) closed the books on 2025 and reported record figures.
In early 2026, the company will cease to exist. The Sumitomo Corporation, SMBC Aviation Capital, Apollo, and Brookfield funds are expected to acquire Air Lease Corporation for $7.4bn in the early part of this year and rebrand it the Sumisho Air Lease Corporation (SALC). SALC will be a new powerhouse lessor that Airbus, Boeing, and the engine makers will be dealing with.
According to ALC, Air Lease Class A common stockholders will receive $65 in cash for each share of Class A common stock of Air Lease held immediately prior to the effective time of the merger.
SMBC will then service most of Sumisho Air Lease Corp.’s fleet, significantly expanding its service portfolio.
Thus, the world’s second-largest commercial aircraft lessor will be born, as the third and fourth largest lessors merge (by fleet size in the 2025 Airfinance Global annual lessors analysis), second only to Aercap of Dublin (IR).
Source: Airfinance Global 2025 Annual Lessor Report.
The state of alternative propulsion aircraft? Part 7.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
March 12, 2026, © Leeham News: In our series on the state of alternative propulsion projects, we are analysing where the electric hybrid projects are and how parallel hybrids work and perform.
Figure 1. The Pratt & Whitney Parallel Hybrid DH8-100 test aircraft, presently under preparation. Source: Pratt & Whitney
We summarized the status last week and compared it to the serial hybrids that we analyzed before Christmas. Serial hybrids are motivated in special cases, but in general, they make an aircraft more expensive to produce and operate.
For those who react, “But hybrid work very well for cars”?, let’s summarize: The car thermal engines are energy hogs, and you brake away all the acceleration energy at the next stoplight. Hybrids reduce this waste by recovering energy during braking. Aircraft and aircraft engines are wonders of efficiency by comparison, and there are no energy-recovery phases in an airliner mission.
We now use our Aircraft Performance and Cost Model (APCM) to go deeper into the parallel hybrid. Can it avoid the negative verdict of the serial hybrid?
Supply chain is improving, but the light at the end of the tunnel could be a train
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By Scott Hamilton
Kevin Michaels, AeroDynamic Advisory. Credit: PNAA.
March 9, 2026, © Leeham News: Every year since the end of the global COVID-19 pandemic, everyone associated in whatever capacity with aerospace has complained about the supply chain.
There is a workforce shortage.
Suppliers are unable to meet contractual deadlines.
Airbus and Boeing haven’t been able to deliver their airplanes on time. Sometimes the aircraft are months later.
Engine makers are to blame.
Interior suppliers are to blame.
The little supplier making the widget is to blame.
Delays still plague the industry, but at long, long last, there seems to be a light at the end of the tunnel.
“I don’t want to focus just on the negatives. The bottom line is that the supply chain is improving. You talk to most executives at OEMs, they’ll tell you that supply chain is in better shape today than it was a year ago or two years ago,” said Kevin Michaels, managing director of the supply-chain consulting firm Aerodynamic Advisory.
Nevertheless, there’s a very real possibility that the light is from another set of oncoming trains.
“We’ve had some very interesting dynamics this year,” Michaels said during an appearance last month at the annual Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance (PNAA) conference.
What’s on those trains?
Regulatory bottlenecks and rare earth production concentration and shortages are just two of the overarching areas continuing to face the aerospace industry. Engines and interiors remain challenging.
“Resilience is key” to Airbus production ramp-up
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By David Slotnick
March 5, 2026, © Leeham News: Airbus’ head of procurement shared a rallying cry for both OEMs and suppliers at the Pacific Northwest Aerospace Alliance (PNAA) in suburban Seattle on Feb. 10, ahead of the European planemaker’s plans to increase production to record-breaking rates.
Florian Seidel. Source: Florian Seidel.
In a speech at the annual conference, Florian Seidel, the chief of strategic procurement at Airbus Americas, urged the entire supply chain from top to bottom to focus on working “like Swiss clockwork” as manufacturing increases and airline customers continue to require support throughout each aircraft’s operating life.
The call for continued close collaboration and efficiency comes as Airbus sets its sights on production rates that exceed even peak pre-pandemic levels. While Airbus plans to increase rates on all of its commercial programs, Seidel described the target on the A320-family — 75 per month in 2027 — as “the most impressive” ramp-up, requiring a “huge effort across the entire supply base.” (Update: A week later, during the Airbus earnings call for 2025, this target has shifted to 2028.)
Additionally, Airbus plans to grow the A220 to 12 per month this year, the widebody A330 to 5 per month by 2029, and the flagship A350 to 12 per month in 2028.
“Resilience is key” to making that ramp-up successful and sustaining those rates, Seidel said.
“This is a ramp-up that’s unprecedented, and that we require the resolve of the entire supply base to make it happen,” he added.