Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: New engine development. Part 4. Propulsive efficiency April 19, 2024
- Boeing unlikely to meet FAA’s 90-day deadline for new safety program April 18, 2024
- Focus on quality not slowing innovation, says GKN April 18, 2024
- Boeing defends 787, 777 against whistleblower charges April 17, 2024
- Dissecting Boeing CEO’s statement next new airplane will cost $50bn April 15, 2024
IAM won’t release its offer details; IAM v Itself v Boeing
IAM’s offer to Boeing: While IAM 751 released its analysis of the Boeing contract offer of last week, it refuses to release its own offer to Boeing. We asked for it and received a terse, “That’s not available.” Thus, we are left with 751’s analysis that Boeing’s offer is unreasonable and basically unchanged from the one voted upon November 13 (and rejected by a 2-1 margin). But we don’t know how reasonable or not the 751 counter-proposal was, which was rejected by Boeing.
751’s refusal to disclose its counter to Boeing also leaves its own membership in the dark.
Meanwhile, a Chicago Tribune columnist isn’t too enthused about the Boeing “asks.” Chicago, of course, is where Boeing’s corporate headquarters are and Illinois is one of the state’s bidding for the 777X project. As we wrote on December 9, the audacity of Boeing’s asks are mind-boggling. Others are waking up to this fact.
Another analysis notes how little leverage the IAM has right now because this contract negotiation comes well before the current contract expires in 2016, and as a result 751 can’t strike.
But mark our words: if Boeing puts the 777X elsewhere after trying to strong-arm the union (in their view), there will be a retaliatory strike in 2016 regardless of the offers. This happened in 2008 as payback for the 2002 and 2005 contracts and outsourcing that came from them.
The IAM 751 members are going to strike themselves right out of a job. But we have seen the IAM shut down a company rather than give concessions, and call that a victory. (Eastern Airlines, 1991.)
IAM v Itself v Boeing: It’s no surprise that the IAM v itself v Boeing continues to dominate the aerospace news, at least in the US.
The Seattle Times has two stories in its Sunday paper worthy of note:
IAM is between a rock and a hard place (IAM v Boeing)
Two key players in the drama (International v Local)
Separately:
- Reuters has this analysis on Boeing win over Airbus at Air Canada.
In focus: the 777 Classic
This week we take a look at the Boeing 777 Classic primary and secondary markets as a follow-on to our report last week in advance of the A340 Summit hosted by Airbus, Rolls-Royce and CFM International with additional presentations by Lufthansa Airlines and HiFly. We have a follow-up of this meeting on Leeham News and Comment.
The 777 Classic presents a very different picture compared with the A340. As a reminder, here is the current status of the A340 program, which is now out of production:
|
Status |
A340-200 |
A340-300 |
A340-500 |
A340-600 |
|
In Service |
19 |
175 |
20 |
90 |
|
Stored |
6 |
27 |
14 |
7 |
Source: Ascend Leeham Co Chart
On the other hand, Boeing has delivered 1,156 777 Classics and has a current backlog of 318. There are 259 orders and commitments for the 777X, officially launched last month at the Dubai Air Show, for a total of 1,415.
The Ascend data base, which tallies Letters of Intent, Options and Option LOIs, (and calculates orders and commitments somewhat differently than Boeing), has 2,059 units listed.
|
|
777-200 (All) |
777-300 (All) |
777 Classic TBD |
777-8 |
777-9 |
777X TBD |
|
In Service |
637 |
504 |
|
|
|
|
|
Orders |
43 |
272 |
|
8 |
45 |
|
|
Options |
35 |
68 |
1 |
|
|
62 |
|
Option LOIs |
20 |
5 |
15 |
|
|
|
|
LOIs |
42 |
75 |
6 |
35 |
179 |
|
|
Stored |
6 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
|
Total |
783 |
925 |
22 |
43 |
224 |
62 |
|
Source: Ascend |
|
|
|
|
Leeham Co. Chart |
|
The 777 program has been more successful than Boeing’s wildest dreams, and the 777X is off to a promising start.
While Airbus faces challenges with the A340 family on the secondary market, Boeing doesn’t have any similar issues today. There are just seven Classics stored, according to Ascend: six 200s and one 300, compared with 54 A340s of all sub-types, or 15% of the total fleet compared with 0.6% for the 777 Classics.
Most of the Classics remain with the original operators. Only a few -200ERs and five -200LRs have traded, the latter a special case because the original operator, Air India, was in financial distress and elected to dispose of the airplanes at a distressed price to raise cash.
What is the secondary market potential for the Classics? Market Intelligence suggest very little-to-no market for the 86 777-200 “standards,” the light-weight, 545,000 lb, 5,240nm initial version of the Classic family. The heavier weight 777-200ER at 656,000 lbs and 7,725nm range is a secondary passenger market and a freighter conversion candidate. Boeing has been studying a P2F conversion for the 200ER, but this potentially is a costly option, according to the Market.
The -200ER was optimized for passenger service and includes composite floor beams that will have to be replaced with steel beams, according to a 2012 Boeing briefing. Major structures and component work will be required. Then, Boeing assumed early -200ERs would be priced in the high $20m range, and the conversion would cost in the low $30m, for an out-the-door price of the low $60m.
Kostya Zolotusky, managing director for Capital Market Leasing at Boeing Capital Corp., tells us that nothing has changed in P2F timing. Feedstock values, however, are too high and a weak cargo market means there are plenty of Boeing 747-400s and MD-11s surplus today. Boeing does not expect the freighter market being strong at least for a couple years.
He believes there is a potential market for the 777-200 standard for package carriers outside the mature USA market. A 777-200ER P2F would be a different airplane vs the new-build 777-200LRF: an 80 tonne airplane vs 100T.
Zolotusky notes that the 777 “has one of the lowest movements out of the original operators out of all the wide-bodies. There is nothing that is parked or in distress.” All 777s are within 90 percentile of original operator, he tells us and compared the Airbus A330s in 80s and the A340s in 70s.
One of the issues with the A340s are the Power By Hour arrangements with Rolls-Royce for the A340-500/600 engines. “We are talking to engine makers to be sure we don’t have A340 situation that limits the liquidity with PBH situation,” Zolotusky tells us.
While this is a follow-on to the A340 report of last week, Zolotusky urged that we “decouple the conversation from A340. The A340 became economically unviable.”
IAM 751 issues analysis of Boeing contract offer
IAM 751 issued an analysis of Boeing’s most recent contract offer and of the contract that was rejected in a November 13 vote.
751’s president, Tom Wroblewski, accompanied the analysis with a message to members. This is below the jump (there isn’t a unique link to it).
We’ve asked Boeing for its analysis. If it supplies one, we’ll post it.
Meanwhile, at a time when tensions are high, a little warped sarcasm might lighten the mood a bit. Here it is from a columnist for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
IAM 751’s president issues message to members: here’s why you can’t vote
Update, 11 am PST: Boeing’s Doug Alder just sent us this statement:
The union leadership rejected Boeing’s best and final counterproposal. Boeing did not withdraw its counterproposal, nor was there any need to do so, because the counterproposal was rejected.
Original Post:
Reprinted here without comment:
Dear Brothers and Sisters:
Several hundred of our 30,000 members at Boeing e-mailed me overnight to ask why you can’t vote on the company’s most-recent contract offer. The answer is simple:
There is no offer to vote.
Boeing’s offer was only on the table Thursday so long as I agreed to recommend the offer and urge you to vote yes on it. But I could not recommend you accept this offer. When I said we couldn’t do that, Boeing withdrew the offer immediately.
So there is no offer to vote.
As union leaders, we couldn’t go onto the shop floor to ask you to accept this proposal. Despite what Boeing is saying, the offer was almost identical to the one you rejected by a 2-to-1 margin on Nov. 13.
In the four-page document they passed to us Thursday afternoon, we could only identify four changes from the Nov. 13 offer, and they weren’t significant:
Boeing sweetened the pot with an additional $5,000 lump-sum bonus – payable in 2020. It is not a $15,000 bonus now, it is still a $10,000 bonus now.
Boeing increased annual maximum dental coverage – by $500 per person in 2020, and by another $500 per person in 2024.
Boeing promised to extend the Letter of Understanding that guarantees we will keep doing 737 MAX work until 2024 – but passed no contract language on it, leaving us uncertain of how solid that guarantee was.
Boeing agreed to back down from its plan to keep new hires in progression for up to 22 years, and to go back to the current system that gets new hires to the maximum rate in six years.Their proposal also called for a “joint evaluation” of the progression system.
Every other item was EXACTLY THE SAME as the offer you rejected Nov. 13.
I think you’ll agree these were very minor changes, and not nearly enough to offset the things Boeing was trying to take away from you, and for the Machinists who will join us in the future:
Freezing your pensions, eliminating them for new Machinists and replacing them with a “savings plan” so vague we couldn’t tell you anything about how it would work.
Raising everyone’s health care contributions by as much as $4,000 a year over 2011 levels by the end of the contract.
Limiting future wage increases to 1 percent every other year, and locking in current starting pay rates until 2024, when thousands of Boeing jobs would be below minimum wage.
Given that you had voted so overwhelmingly against an almost identical proposal on Nov. 13, I didn’t see any point in bringing it to you for a vote, and our Business Reps agreed with me.
So, until Boeing changes its conditions, we don’t have an offer to vote on.
I’m sorry that there has been confusion over this issue, especially by the reported comments of the retired leader from our International headquarters, who seems to be suggesting there’s still an offer hiding out there somewhere, just waiting for you to vote on. I understand that many of you are frustrated, and I don’t blame you.
I simply ask that you work together with me as we continue to make the case that Boeing’s best chance for success – by far – is to build the 777X here in Washington state, utilizing the skills, experience and dedication of the finest aerospace workers in the world: the Machinists of District 751.
In solidarity
Tom Wroblewski
Airbus to cut new airplane R&D, focus more on derivatives
Airbus is going to cut back its new airplane research and development spending and redirect efforts more toward derivative airplanes, EADS CEO Tom Enders told aerospace analysts at the EADS Global Investors Forum.
Buried in a Bloomberg News report of the GIF is this:
Enders also wants to curb cash-hungry development efforts in favor of milking existing products for higher returns. At Airbus, he backed the re-engining of the A320 narrow-body over building a new plane. No new jets are planned at Airbus beyond the A350, which is due to commence deliveries late next year.
“Why should we spend large amounts of money when we can make significant incremental improvements?” he said. “This principle can be applied outside of just civil aircraft.”
Airbus, like Boeing, suffered under the strain of new aircraft programs, notably the A380 and A400M. As yet, the A350 doesn’t seem to have been a black hole, with normal development costs.
Richard Aboulafia of The Teal Group was critical of Boeing for years for starving R&D for new aircraft and over-relying on derivatives while Airbus invested in new aircraft programs. He had this to say about Enders’ news:
This is only possible as a percent of sales. Airbus is at a twin aisle product line disadvantage relative to Boeing, so this isn’t the time for them to rest on their laurels. Some kind of response to the 777-9X is essential, even if it arrives a few years after the Boeing jet. Whether it’s an A350-1100 or a clean sheet, it requires a significant investment right after A350XWB-800/900/1000 spending winds down. Thus, in absolute numbers, the company would be advised to keep spending high for the next ten years. But on the positive side, since Airbus’s revenue will grow with A350 (and incrementally with the A320 neo), the company’s percent of revenue spent on IRAD will decline.
Enders’ comments reflect the changing nature of Airbus’s shareholder relations more than anything else. They’ll need to focus more on profitability rather than new product development over the next ten years; they may wind up looking more like Boeing.
IAM, Boeing talks fail; 777X site selection evaluation continues; Update: Members to vote on deal
Update, 11:30pm PST: KIRO TV (CBS Seattle) quotes Boeing spokesman Doug Alder as saying the Boeing offer has not been withdrawn, contradicting the IAM 751’s understanding.
Update, 9:10 PM PST: The Seattle Times reports the IAM 751 membership will get to vote on Boeing’s counter-contract offer after all.
Original Post:
Talks between Boeing and the IAM 751 machinists union failed to reach an agreement when Boeing presented a counter-proposal to the union’s offer that did’t budge on the pension issue, according to The Seattle Times.
KING5 TV (NBC Seattle) has this story.
Boeing’s statement is here.
IAM 751’s statement is below the jump (there isn’t a unique link to it).
The Boeing and IAM 751 statements paint a very different picture of the offers.
Our take:
Although both sides now have said talks have ended, we fully expect political pressure on both sides to resume talks before Boeing makes a final decision on the 777X assembly site.
Boeing said it will make a decision early next year; our sources suggest this timeline is the end of January.
This leave a small window for a third try, but we’re not optimistic.
We believe that barring an agreement, Boeing Chicago will elect to put the 777X assembly site and wing production somewhere other than Washington.
We believe that those within the IAM membership who believe Boeing is bluffing are mistaken. One need look no further than the events leading to putting 787 Line 2 in Charleston. Members believed Boeing was bluffing then, and it wasn’t.
As we have written many times, while Boeing Commercial Airplanes is understood to want to assembly the 777X in Everett, headquarters in Chicago has a very different view–and in the end, it’s only that view that counts.
One item in the Boeing statement stands out like Braille to us as well:
In addition, a separate agreement committing final assembly of the 737 MAX at the Renton, Wash. site would have been extended through 2024.
For those who think it impossible Boeing wouldn’t start another 737 assembly line elsewhere, we understand from two sources close to Boeing that a study is underway about opening a 737 assembly line in Charleston. Some 737 MAX work has already been assigned there, and Boeing continues to buy land there.
We firmly believe that the industrial logic–and all other logic–demands that the 777X (and the 737 MAX) assembly be in Puget Sound. But Boeing CEO Jim McNerney is clearly intent on moving work away from the unions (and from Washington State) absent dramatic changes in contracts and the cost of doing business.
Boeing offered terms and conditions in the IAM contract that were sure to be rejected.
The PR war of who is responsible will continue for some time to come. But just as we firmly believe the 777X should be built in Washington, we also firmly believe it won’t be without some last minute agreement.
Washington politicians need to step up their effort to look Beyond Boeing for the future of the state’s aerospace industry.