Recent headlines and this column report that Airbus is considering re-engining the popular A330 with GE Aviation GEnx or Rolls-Royce Trent 1000-TEN power plants. A New Engine Option and other changes would improve the A330’s economy by an estimated 10% percent after offsets for increased drag and weight.
But the A330 isn’t the only Airbus airplane being considered for new engines made popular by the A320neo family. Tim Clark, president and chief operating officer of Emirates Airlines, urged Airbus to improve efficiency of the giant A380 with engine technology found in newer generation aircraft.
How feasible is an A380neo? What are the technological issues? Would there be enough of an economic gain? And is there a market for an A380neo?
The A380 of today
The A380 has been hailed as a highly efficient airliner since it went into service 2008, assuming the giant plane can be filled. But only six years later, the first voices have been raised that this will not continue to be the case should the continuous improvements that have been flowing into the airframe not pick up speed.
The launch of the Boeing 777X also brought focus on the state of the A380 come the latter part of this decade when the 777-9X enters flight testing in advance of its planned 2020 entry-into-service. Tim Clark expressed that “it is time that the A380 gets an injection of the new technology which is now becoming available for the A320/737 in the form of GTF/LEAP and GE9X for the 777X. “
Before we look into what can be done short-to–mid-term to inject improved efficiency, let’s establish the baseline as it exists today. The A380 is considered by some the most efficient way of flying passengers between two long haul points if there is enough of demand. The competition today is the Boeing 777-300ER and 747-8i. (Qantas Airways is dropping some A380 flights that have 50% load factors, demonstrating the aircraft is inefficient if the demand is insufficient.)
Let’s assume we want to transport passengers between San Francisco and Hong Kong, one of the longer flights which are made non-stop in both directions. Going West, it takes a Cathay 777-300ER 15 hours and going East, 12 hours, the difference being due to prevailing headwinds going West. For our check, we will use the more demanding of these legs, which then works out as the equivalent of flying 7,200nm. To compare the three different aircraft in a fair way, we need to load them to the same payload, in our case passengers with luggage. We will not consider cargo in this initial analysis. The leg chosen is not one which allows much weight for cargo, but cargo certainly belongs to a complete analysis of an airplane and we will point out where it will affect any conclusions.
When comparing the standard three-class seating numbers between the OEMs, it is clear these are not made to the same standards of comfort. Airbus has admitted that the A380 is too lightly loaded at 525 passengers. The 777-300ER at nine abreast and 365 seats is equipped with a comfortable 18’’ economy class at 32’’ pitch but the business class is modeled with a non-standard 48’’ pitch. The 747-8i at 467 seats is not laid out to any comfort standards comparable to the other two. To ensure an apples-to-apples comparison we have equipped all aircraft with the same three-class cabin with a standard seating consisting of first class at 81’’ pitch, business class at 60’’ pitch and economy class with 32’’ pitch. Seat widths are 37’’, 22’’ and 18’ respectively and the ratios of the different premium seatings vs. economy are kept the same. Here the aircraft are listed with the in-service year and with their respective payload capabilities:
Note: The following was distributed to our e-mail list December 23. Last week, American Airlines (as predicted) swapped the A350-800s for A350-900s.
The possibility of Airbus launching an A330 new engine option appears to be gaining ground.
Our Market Intelligence tells us that Airbus is considering a decision soon, probably next year, with a target entry-into-service date of 2018.
A decision to proceed with an A330neo would come after one to drop the A350-800, according to our information. Airbus has systematically switched -800 customers to the larger, and more profitable A350-900 and A350-1000. There are now just 79 A350-800s in backlog.
Customer |
Qty |
Comments |
Aeroflot |
8 |
|
Aircraft Purchase Fleet |
12 |
For Alitalia |
Asiana |
8 |
|
AWAS |
2 |
Probably will swap to A359 |
Hawaiian Airlines |
6 |
Waiting on US Airways |
ILFC |
6 |
Probably will swap to A359 |
Kingfisher |
5 |
Good as gone |
Libyan |
4 |
|
US Airways |
18 |
Expected to disappear now that AA merger completed, replaced with A359/A351 |
Yemenia |
10 |
|
Source: Airbus, Nov. 2013 |
79 |
Leeham Co Chart |
We identify 37, or 47%, that probably are already at risk of cancellation in favor of the larger A350-900 or A350-1000. These 37 are highlighted in red and pink. Another 10, those for Yemenia, are probably already iffy, according to Market Intelligence. The total of 47 represents 59% of the backlog. We have no information on the remaining customers’ intentions.
This week we take a look at the Boeing 777 Classic primary and secondary markets as a follow-on to our report last week in advance of the A340 Summit hosted by Airbus, Rolls-Royce and CFM International with additional presentations by Lufthansa Airlines and HiFly. We have a follow-up of this meeting on Leeham News and Comment.
The 777 Classic presents a very different picture compared with the A340. As a reminder, here is the current status of the A340 program, which is now out of production:
Status |
A340-200 |
A340-300 |
A340-500 |
A340-600 |
In Service |
19 |
175 |
20 |
90 |
Stored |
6 |
27 |
14 |
7 |
Source: Ascend Leeham Co Chart
On the other hand, Boeing has delivered 1,156 777 Classics and has a current backlog of 318. There are 259 orders and commitments for the 777X, officially launched last month at the Dubai Air Show, for a total of 1,415.
The Ascend data base, which tallies Letters of Intent, Options and Option LOIs, (and calculates orders and commitments somewhat differently than Boeing), has 2,059 units listed.
|
777-200 (All) |
777-300 (All) |
777 Classic TBD |
777-8 |
777-9 |
777X TBD |
In Service |
637 |
504 |
|
|
|
|
Orders |
43 |
272 |
|
8 |
45 |
|
Options |
35 |
68 |
1 |
|
|
62 |
Option LOIs |
20 |
5 |
15 |
|
|
|
LOIs |
42 |
75 |
6 |
35 |
179 |
|
Stored |
6 |
1 |
|
|
|
|
Total |
783 |
925 |
22 |
43 |
224 |
62 |
Source: Ascend |
|
|
|
|
Leeham Co. Chart |
The 777 program has been more successful than Boeing’s wildest dreams, and the 777X is off to a promising start.
While Airbus faces challenges with the A340 family on the secondary market, Boeing doesn’t have any similar issues today. There are just seven Classics stored, according to Ascend: six 200s and one 300, compared with 54 A340s of all sub-types, or 15% of the total fleet compared with 0.6% for the 777 Classics.
Most of the Classics remain with the original operators. Only a few -200ERs and five -200LRs have traded, the latter a special case because the original operator, Air India, was in financial distress and elected to dispose of the airplanes at a distressed price to raise cash.
What is the secondary market potential for the Classics? Market Intelligence suggest very little-to-no market for the 86 777-200 “standards,” the light-weight, 545,000 lb, 5,240nm initial version of the Classic family. The heavier weight 777-200ER at 656,000 lbs and 7,725nm range is a secondary passenger market and a freighter conversion candidate. Boeing has been studying a P2F conversion for the 200ER, but this potentially is a costly option, according to the Market.
The -200ER was optimized for passenger service and includes composite floor beams that will have to be replaced with steel beams, according to a 2012 Boeing briefing. Major structures and component work will be required. Then, Boeing assumed early -200ERs would be priced in the high $20m range, and the conversion would cost in the low $30m, for an out-the-door price of the low $60m.
Kostya Zolotusky, managing director for Capital Market Leasing at Boeing Capital Corp., tells us that nothing has changed in P2F timing. Feedstock values, however, are too high and a weak cargo market means there are plenty of Boeing 747-400s and MD-11s surplus today. Boeing does not expect the freighter market being strong at least for a couple years.
He believes there is a potential market for the 777-200 standard for package carriers outside the mature USA market. A 777-200ER P2F would be a different airplane vs the new-build 777-200LRF: an 80 tonne airplane vs 100T.
Zolotusky notes that the 777 “has one of the lowest movements out of the original operators out of all the wide-bodies. There is nothing that is parked or in distress.” All 777s are within 90 percentile of original operator, he tells us and compared the Airbus A330s in 80s and the A340s in 70s.
One of the issues with the A340s are the Power By Hour arrangements with Rolls-Royce for the A340-500/600 engines. “We are talking to engine makers to be sure we don’t have A340 situation that limits the liquidity with PBH situation,” Zolotusky tells us.
While this is a follow-on to the A340 report of last week, Zolotusky urged that we “decouple the conversation from A340. The A340 became economically unviable.”
Airbus held a summit December 4 for stakeholders in the A340 to explain how there continues to be life after production ended and despite being a four-engined airplane in a two-engine world.
Key to the future of this out-of-production airliner is increasing the capacity of the A340-600 to an exit-limited 475 seats and for Rolls-Royce to alter its Total Care engine maintenance Power-by-the-Hour terms and conditions to reduce costs.
Airlines, financiers, appraisers and the engine makers were invited by John Leahy, chief operating officer-Customers of Airbus. Engine providers CFM International, Rolls-Royce, Lufthansa Airlines and Hi Fly, a small European airline, made presentations in addition to Airbus.
Airbus produced 246 A340-200/300s and 131 A340-500/600s; 227 and 131 respectively are in operation or parked.
Status |
A340-200 |
A340-300 |
A340-500 |
A340-600 |
In Service |
19 |
175 |
20 |
90 |
Stored |
6 |
27 |
14 |
7 |
Airbus guaranteed the residual value on an unknown number, and has strong motivation to see these airplanes continue in service, according to one person familiar with the situation.
AirAsia on Airbus: AirAsia Group is one of Airbus’ largest customers, and its CEO Tony Fernandes is increasingly influential in the Asian sector. He’s also into car racing, often betting Virgin Group’s Richard Branson. This short interview details Fernandes’ view on the prospective A330neo–something Fernandes has been pushing for some time–and what he thinks Airbus should do with the A380.
Looking at the 777X: Aviation Week has a detailed look at the Boeing 777X “under the skin.” Fuel burn, engine thrust and general specifications are in the article. Aviation Week also has a series of videos from the Dubai Air Show here. Topics: 777X, Qatar Airways and A380 engines. On the latter, Emirates CEO Tim Clark suggests putting the new GE9X or Rolls-Royce Trent on the A380 to reduce fuel burn by 10%.
Last week we discussed Airbus’ A350-1000 dilemma. The -1000 will be a fine airplane, but we concluded the company needs to go forward with a larger capacity “A350-1100” to match the size of the Boeing 777-9X, but take the Boeing 787-10 approach and be content with sacrificing range in lieu of designing a new wing and engines.
Airbus’ A350 dilemma doesn’t end there. What’s it to do with the A350-800? One fleet planner told us a year or more ago that the “-800 is an expensive A330-300” with the same operating costs as the larger capacity A350-900.
Airbus has been encouraging customers to move up to the larger A350-900, with Hawaiian Airlines and US Airways the key hold outs. Conventional wisdom says US Airways will swap its order once the merger with American Airlines goes through (which is looking more and more likely, given settlement talks with the Department of Justice). American has a large order for the Boeing 787-9, making the -800 unnecessary in a combined carrier fleet plan.
There are now around 80 -800s in Airbus’ backlog, and even officials at Airbus have been ambiguous about green-lighting production of the -800, which is supposed to enter service in 2016 (after the -900 but before the -1000). We have written several posts in which we concluded the -800 would be re-sequenced to 2018, after the 2017 EIS of the -1000.
We believe there is a very good chance the A350-800 will be dropped in favor of proceeding with an A350-1100.
So what’s Airbus to do in the 250-300 seat space now occupied by the -800 and the aging A330 family?
Airbus has a dilemma with what to do about the A350-1000.
.
Does the OEM stick with the -1000 as it is, ceding the 400 seat segment to Boeing with its new 777-9X? Or does it stretch the -1000 (we’ll call it the “1100” for a placeholder) for what appears to be a very limited market segment?
.
If Airbus does stretch the -1000, what does this stretch look like? One that will match the 9X range and capacity? Or one that matches the capacity but not the range?
Here are the implications of the dilemma facing Airbus.
.
Stay the Course
For a long time, Airbus officials said they were satisfied with the design, once tweaked, of the -1000 and they didn’t need to respond to a “paper” airplane. The characterization had a ring to it, for that’s what Boeing officials often said about the -1000: it wasn’t a “real” airplane, they didn’t know what it was, it was a “paper” airplane or some variation thereto.
.
Of course, this was rhetoric by both parties. Lufthansa Airlines ordered 34 777-9s. A huge order+option commitment is anticipated at the Dubai Air Show from Emriates Airlines for the -9 and the smaller, ultra-long range (ULR) -8 that is sized directly across from the -1000. Airbus is now faced with the prospect of Boeing once more having a monopoly position with the 777-9 as it did for many years with the 777-300ER.
.
Does Airbus want to cede the 400-seat segment to a Boeing monopoly? The question is, how big is this segment? Is there a business case to build the airplane, or one that’s big enough for two airplanes?
.
Boeing’s current 20 year forecast indicated there is a need for 4,530 “small” twin aisle, 200-300 seat jets and 3,300 for “medium” twin aisle jets, 300-400 seats, for a total 7,830. Airbus forecasts a need for 4,694 250-300 seat jets and 2,085 350-400 seaters, for 6,779 jets, a difference of nearly 1,100-but, then, Airbus doesn’t have a competitor to the 787-8 at the lower end of the small jet sector.
.
Airbus further breaks out its forecast: 2,438 250-seat and 2,256 300-seat jets within the “small” twin; and 1,306 350-seat and 779 400-seat jets within the “medium” twin category. Boeing doesn’t subdivide its forecast.
.
The 777-9 will kill the near-dormant 747-8 Intercontinental and will likely eat into sales of the Airbus A380. Does Airbus avoid cannibalizing its own product or does it allow Boeing the monopoly to do so?
Source: Great Circle Mapper
Match the 777-9
Airbus could decide that, despite a its own narrow forecast for a 400 seat segment, it would be better to play in this sandbox, whatever the impact on the A380, than to cede this segment to Boeing. The question then arises, does an A350-1100 match the 777-9 in seats (or come close to it) and range, around 8,100nm-8,400nm?
To match means a major undertaking for a small number of airlines that need a plane with this range. It means a new wing–typically a $3bn project, more or less–and new engines in the 104,000-105,000 lb thrust range. The Rolls-Royce Trent XWB on the A350-1000 is 97,000 lbs and it can’t be pushed any farther, our information tells us. The cost of developing an entirely new engine for such a narrow market doesn’t have a business case. One might exist on the presumption that engines have to get bigger, and a new engine design would provide the basis for an entirely new generation of engines. After all, the Trent fundamentally has been around since the A330. It may well be time, but is an A350-1100 the product from which to develop it? Furthermore, it takes at least seven years to develop a new engine and probably a lot longer. The engine is the pacing item, far more than the airframe. Even if the go-ahead were given this minute, Airbus and RR would be hard-pressed to come up with an A350-1100 by 2020, when the 777-9 EIS is anticipated. So…
The 787-10 Approach
The most viable option for stretching the A350-1000 appears to be following the approach Boeing took with the 787-10: a couple of simple fuselage plugs, some enhancements to the existing engines, the same wing and reduced range that covers 90% of the markets required by the airlines–foregoing the miniscule need by Emirates Airlines for that last 5%-10%.
Source: Great Circle Mapper
An A350-1100 with reduced range of 7,000nm-7,500nm and a 400 seat capacity would have highly favorable cost per available seat miles. It wouldn’t get you from Paris to Tahiti, but how big is this market? It wouldn’t get you from Dubai to Los Angeles, but are billions of dollars worth of R&D to do so going to get the return on investment to make sense for this airplane?
The clear choice, the financially responsible choice, and the expeditious choice appears to follow the Boeing approach and develop an A350-1100 (or, perhaps, the “A350-1000-10”).
Ethiopian 787: Dominic Gates at The Seattle Times has a detailed story about how Boeing is repairing the Ethiopian Airlines 787 damaged by a fire at London Heathrow Airport earlier this year. Boeing doesn’t comment for the story–nor for any others–but Gates’ detail in his piece makes for quite interesting reading.
Stretching the A350-1000: More on this topic from Aviation Week. Aside from the technical considerations for the airframe, Rolls-Royce would need to bump up the thrust of the engine to around 104,000 lbs, we’re told. Also: there is the matter of production. Airbus is considering a second production line for the A350, but no decision has been made.
Rolls-Royce studies new engines: Rolls-Royce is studying a new line of engines, according to this Bloomberg article.