Leeham News and Analysis
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Bjorn’s Corner: Why is the real range of an airliner always shorter then what the OEM says?
By Bjorn Fehrm
07 August 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Now that we have explained the range consequences of weight and fuel limited airplane operations, we might as well explain the last important part of the range of an airliner: Why the practical range is always shorter than what the OEM says.
When an airliner OEM gives the design or brochure maximum range of an aircraft, they do that with an aircraft in a “show-room” configuration and which is loaded with a filled cabin only; no cargo is included in the calculation. Further, in the cargo area, there is only bulk-loaded passenger bags. Container loading of the bags would have cost tare weight for the containers used and weight is to be avoided when stipulating the maximum design range.
In practice, we would have to consider tare weight for bags containers and possible cargo when discussing what practical range an airline can plan for a certain aircraft model. But this is far from the whole story. Here is what has to be considered in addition.
Airbus fills in production gap for A330.
By Bjorn Fehrm
Introduction
Aug 3, 2015, © Leeham Co. Airbus successfully filled its production gap for the A330ceo for the transition to the A330neo, officials said Friday during the 1H2015 earnings call.
Production rate for the A330ceo can be maintained at the previously announced reduced rate of 6/mo, said CFO Harald Wilhelm.
Airbus Group reported solid progress in all areas where we previously described it had outstanding challenges. Cleaned from one time effects (among them a Dassualt share sale income of € 748m), sales and profit where 6% higher than 1H2014 at € 28.9bn and € 1.88bn respectively. Free Cash flow consumption was now € 1bn instead of € 2.3bn last year. Airbus expects to be Cash Flow neutral on a full year basis.
Rather than going through all figures of the results, we will now go through each major program in Airbus Group and try to understand whether it is a contributor to profits or a consumer of company cash.
Rolls-Royce and Safran, major European engine OEMs with different fortunes.
By Bjorn Fehrm
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July 30, 2015 © Leeham Co. Rolls-Royce and Safran, the parent company of CFM partner Snecma, released their Q2 and first half 2015 earnings today. It is interesting to compare these companies as they are in different strategic situations in their dominant business segments, civil turbofan engines.
Civil turbofans constitute 52% of Rolls-Royce total business whereas it makes 54% of Safran’s turn over. Rolls-Royce’s focus has been widebody engines to the point where it exited its part of International Aero Engines, which makes the single aisle V2500 engine, three years ago. Safran on the other hand is heavily invested in the single aisle market through its 50% part in CFM through its Snecma subsidiary.
The present situation and the future outlook for these two companies are intimately aligned with this strategic difference. We look at why and how this will affect their immediate future.
Summary:
- Rolls-Royce is experiencing migration problems in its widebody turbofan business. Its bread and butter Trent 700 engine is on its way out and it takes until 2018 for the replacement, Trent 7000, to kick in.
- Other programs are only growing slowly: the Trent 1000 for Boeing’s 787 or Trent XWB for the Airbus A350.
- Safran civil turbofan business Snecma is enjoying record sales and deliveries through its CFM joint venture with GE.
- Despite sharing its revenue 50:50 with GE, the business turnover is the size of Rolls-Royce turbofan business today and larger tomorrow. Profit margins are three times higher.
Fancher takes on KC-46A; FAA investigating Allegiant Air
July 30, 2015: Scott Fancher, regarded as the person to come in and take over troubled programs at Boeing, has been named to take over the KC-46A program.
Scott Fancher. Source: Boeing.
Fancher originally came to Boeing Commercial Airplanes from the Boeing defense unit to take over the 787 program at a time when development and design issues were rampant and the plane had yet to be delivered to a single customer.
After that was straightened out, Fancher took over new airplane programs and then moved to oversee development of the 777X, which is Boeing’s response to the Airbus A350 XWB. Although the 777X is a derivative, Boeing’s 747-8 derivative was two years late (in no small part due to the knock-on effects of the 787 program problems). Fancher’s charge with 777X was to be sure it comes in on time and on budget.
Spirit Aerosystems: Higher profits on lower revenue
July 29, 2015: Spirit Aerosystems, whose principal business is a major OEM supplier to Boeing but which also makes fuselage panels for the Airbus A350, reported 
lower revenues but higher profits for the FY2Q2015.
The press release is here.
Revenues were down because the company sold its Gulfstream wing sector and lower revenues were recognized from the Boeing 787 program.
“Preparing for aircraft rate increases is a key focus for us this year. Near term, we are capitalizing to increase the production rate of the 787 to 12 shipsets per month and the 737 to 47 shipsets per month, as well as the higher production rates on the A320 and A350 programs,” said Larry Lawson, CEO.
Wells Fargo has this initial reaction:
Triumph Group disappoints, cites decreased aircraft production
July 29, 2015: Triumph Group reported lower FY1Q2016 earnings below analyst expectations, citing in part decreased production of the commercial Airbus A330
program as well as lower production of the Gulfstream G450/550 and Boeing C-17 and 747-8 airplanes. It’s previously taken large write-offs of the Boeing 747-8 program on its poor sales.
Triumph said in its press release:
The Aerostructures segment reported net sales of $611.8 million in the first quarter of fiscal year 2016 compared to $612.2 million in the prior fiscal year period. Organic sales for the quarter declined fourteen percent primarily due to decreased production on the C-17, 747-8, A330 and G450/G550 programs. Operating income for the first quarter of fiscal year 2016 was $66.0 million, compared to operating income of $68.8 million for the prior year period and included $1.9 million of pre-tax costs related to initial facility consolidation actions. The segment’s operating results for the quarter included a net favorable cumulative catch-up adjustment on long-term contracts of $1.3 million. The segment’s operating margin for the quarter was eleven percent. Excluding the 747-8 program, the segment’s operating margin for the quarter was thirteen percent.
Triumph’s Top 10 programs are mostly Airbus and Boeing commercial airplanes. Boeing makes up more than 10% of Triumph’s 1Q revenue. The earnings call presentation is here. Slide 15 outlines the Top 10 programs.
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Introduction
July 28, 2015: © Leeham Co. Trying to decipher what the airframe Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are going to do is a sporty game that is often analogous to Kremlin watching, especially when it comes to Airbus and Boeing.
The OEMs are naturally circumspect about most everything they do: product development, aircraft pricing, sales campaigns, etc.
They also often are like lawyers when it comes to promoting their products in the public domain: cherry-pick the data that supports your product and which puts your competitor’s product in the worst possible light.
Aerospace analysts, consultants and media (as well as the enthusiast) look anywhere and everywhere for information to discern what the OEMs are up to or how the airplanes are performing or whatever the soup de jour is.
There is more information in the public domain than you would think.
Options for Singapore Airlines to operate direct flights to the US, part 3.
By Bjorn Fehrm
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July 22, 2015 © Leeham Co. We will now finish our series around Singapore Airlines (SQ) need for an Ultra Long Haul (ULH) airliner by looking at what would be the technology and performance of the A350R that Airbus talked about as a possible future model at the launch of A350XWB in 2007.
The A350R as presented was quite different to the A350-900LR that we presented in the first analysis articles. Whereas the A350-900LR is essentially a new Weight Variant (VW) the A350R was an aircraft combining the wing, engines and main landing gear from A350-1000 with the fuselage of A350-900 to create an Ultra Long Haul aircraft (and a freighter variant).
Such an A350 variant could be an interesting aircraft for Singapore or other airlines with a need for a ULH aircraft. We will use our proprietary aircraft model to create the A350R and check its performance against the A350-900LR and Boeing’s 777-8X. This will give an understanding if it could be worth the development effort for Airbus.
Summary:
- A350R would have very high range and payload weight performance.
- It would be a true ULH aircraft with which Airbus could pick a fight with Boeing’s 777-8X on the routes that requires an ULH.
- Its capacity would be volume constrained on a lower level than the 777-8X with better economics per seat and aircraft mile.
- The question remains, given its lower seat count, would it find a market besides the -8X?
Qantas 32: cockpit resource management at work
July 25, 2015: This is a 45 minute Air Crash Investigation episode about the Qantas Airway Flight 32 Airbus A380 engine failure and the subsequent events. Aside from the interesting circumstances, this demonstrates Cockpit Resource Management. What especially caught our eye was at the end, when the Captain made comment of automation vs human crews. With discussion from time-to-time about having one pilot, no pilots or someone on the ground controlling the airplane (as with a drone), this is why we like having real people in the cockpit. Qantas 32 is a good example of of how pilots on the scene vs human monitoring on the ground is the much better way.
https://youtu.be/vbDqpD80_u0