Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Six year turnover in sale/leasebacks put supply-demand balance at risk
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Introduction
August 24, 2015, © Leeham Co. When airlines like Indigo of India, Air Asia, Norwegian Air Shuttle (NAS) and Lion Air have outstanding orders for Airbus A320s and
Boeing 737s that number in the hundreds, far more than operations and growth appears ready to support, the deals raises the natural question: What are they thinking?
As LNC’s Bjorn Fehrm explained Friday, one aspect of these big orders is to “flip” the aircraft every six or seven years, a time that roughly coincides with the maintenance holiday/warranty period. Sale/leasebacks are used to finance these huge purchases.
The practice is hardly new. The USA’s JetBlue Airlines, Ryanair and others practiced this flip for years.
Carriers like the new LCCs mentioned above not only plan to do so to avoid major maintenance costs, but also to fuel their growth. In the case of Lion Air and NAS, these companies also plan to lease out aircraft to other airlines.
But there remain risks involved for the companies and for the industry.
Summary
- The growing practice of flipping aircraft every six or seven years presents risks to lessors.
- Indigo Airlines has 96 aircraft in service, 430 on order.
- Select LCCs in Asia, Europe, India have 1,000 A320s, 737s on order.
Bjorn’s Corner: Sale/Leasebacks
By Bjorn Fehrm
21 August 2015, ©. Leeham Co: IndiGo Airlines firmed up Airbus’ largest aircraft sale by unit numbers in the week. The order is for 250 A320neos. This means the airline goes from 180 A320neos on order to 430. The airline is just finishing off its first order with Airbus for 100 A320ceos, the final eight being delivered over the next months.
How can an airline that did not exist 10 years ago order 430 A320neos?
There are a couple of things that makes this possible, one of them being the Sale/Leaseback. Before we go to Sale/Leaseback and how this enables this magnitude of business, let’s take a quick look at IndiGo. It has certain similarities to other airlines that also close large aircraft deals.
Airbus’ and Boeing’s Payload/Range for VLAs
- Bloomberg reported this week that Airbus is now offering the A350-900LR to Singapore Airlines to reopen ultra-long haul US direct routes. We predicted July 14 that Airbus would offer the LR. We offered some high-level analysis about how Airbus could achieve a long range version of the A350-900; the Bloomberg piece confirms our analysis.
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
Aug. 19 2015, ©. Leeham Co: We will now finish our series over Boeing’s changes to its configuration rule sets by looking at how this affects the Very Large Aircraft (VLA) segment.
Airbus and Boeing used to describe the VLAs in their line-ups using three class cabins, albeit with different standards. Now Boeing has changed its standard to a modern three class seating while Airbus has changed to a four class cabin, including premium economy.
We have enough information of the A380 equipped with a three class cabin to be able to make a comparison using three class rule sets. We will therefore apply a three class cabin to the A380 and 747-8 that will have modern seating standards and pair that with Boeing’s tougher payload weights and enroute reserves.
Summary:
- Boeing’s new Standard rules three class cabin and our normalized three class cabin for A380 and 747-8i are close in their configurations.
- We use our knowledge of these standards to create a level playing field on the cabin side.
- We also apply the new tougher passenger and bags rules + the tougher reserves policy that Boeing’s new Standard rule set prescribes.
- It used to be that A380 had a range advantage at max passenger payload. We check if this remains under the new rules.
Pontifications: Storm warnings ahead
By Scott Hamilton
Aug. 17, 2015 (c) Leeham Co: Sometimes I never know what’s going to exercise readers. Sometimes it’s obvious. Last week it wasn’t.
Our post last week about the formidable challenges still facing Bombardier for the CSeries brought some surprising reaction, particularly on Twitter. And I didn’t see it coming.
The story was behind the paywall, but Canada’s National Post saw the public portion and called to get more information. The Post published some comments from an interview and with permission recreated a chart that was behind the paywall.
We’ve been doing risk assessments of “skyline” quality for a couple of years now, including Bombardier, which is why the reaction to last week’s post came as a surprise.
Our risk assessment has taken a couple of forms. For Bombardier, it’s a Green-Yellow-Red assessment, the meaning of which really doesn’t mean any explanation for anyone who drives a car or, in the aerospace industry, has ever seen Boeing’s Green-Yellow-Red assessment of access to aircraft financing it does every year.
The other symbolic method we use is nautical: Storm Warning Flags, looking at the top 10 narrow- and wide-body customers of Airbus and Boeing and raising a Storm Warning Flag about how solid the order is. We do this annually and the most recent time for Airbus and Boeing customers is here, also behind our paywall.
Bjorn’s Corner: Why is the real range of an airliner always shorter then what the OEM says?
By Bjorn Fehrm
07 August 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Now that we have explained the range consequences of weight and fuel limited airplane operations, we might as well explain the last important part of the range of an airliner: Why the practical range is always shorter than what the OEM says.
When an airliner OEM gives the design or brochure maximum range of an aircraft, they do that with an aircraft in a “show-room” configuration and which is loaded with a filled cabin only; no cargo is included in the calculation. Further, in the cargo area, there is only bulk-loaded passenger bags. Container loading of the bags would have cost tare weight for the containers used and weight is to be avoided when stipulating the maximum design range.
In practice, we would have to consider tare weight for bags containers and possible cargo when discussing what practical range an airline can plan for a certain aircraft model. But this is far from the whole story. Here is what has to be considered in addition.
Mitsubishi opens Seattle Engineering Center ahead of MRJ90 first flight
The MRJ90 testing and entry into service timeline. Source: Mitsubishi. Click on image to enlarge.
August 3, 2015, © Leeham Co.: Mitsubishi Aircraft Corp. today opened its Seattle Engineering Center jointly with local company AeroTEC in advance of the first flight of the MRJ90 in September or October. During the second quarter of next year, four of five MRJ Flight Test Vehicles will be domiciled in Moses Lake in Central Washington for the bulk of the flight testing over the following year. Entry into service is planned for 2Q2017 with launch customer All Nippon Airways.
The engineering center represents the first in Washington State for an aircraft OEM other than Boeing. Mitsubishi will assign 50 engineers from Japan to the new SEC, in South Seattle a short distance from Boeing Field. One hundred engineers will be hired locally.
AeroTEC and Mitsubishi began discussing working together only last January, said president Lee Human, who added that the seven months from January to the opening of the SEC today was remarkable for the speed in which negotiations, contracts, permits and hiring was achieved.
Fancher takes on KC-46A; FAA investigating Allegiant Air
July 30, 2015: Scott Fancher, regarded as the person to come in and take over troubled programs at Boeing, has been named to take over the KC-46A program.
Scott Fancher. Source: Boeing.
Fancher originally came to Boeing Commercial Airplanes from the Boeing defense unit to take over the 787 program at a time when development and design issues were rampant and the plane had yet to be delivered to a single customer.
After that was straightened out, Fancher took over new airplane programs and then moved to oversee development of the 777X, which is Boeing’s response to the Airbus A350 XWB. Although the 777X is a derivative, Boeing’s 747-8 derivative was two years late (in no small part due to the knock-on effects of the 787 program problems). Fancher’s charge with 777X was to be sure it comes in on time and on budget.
Follow the suppliers
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Introduction
July 28, 2015: © Leeham Co. Trying to decipher what the airframe Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) are going to do is a sporty game that is often analogous to Kremlin watching, especially when it comes to Airbus and Boeing.
The OEMs are naturally circumspect about most everything they do: product development, aircraft pricing, sales campaigns, etc.
They also often are like lawyers when it comes to promoting their products in the public domain: cherry-pick the data that supports your product and which puts your competitor’s product in the worst possible light.
Aerospace analysts, consultants and media (as well as the enthusiast) look anywhere and everywhere for information to discern what the OEMs are up to or how the airplanes are performing or whatever the soup de jour is.
There is more information in the public domain than you would think.
Qantas 32: cockpit resource management at work
July 25, 2015: This is a 45 minute Air Crash Investigation episode about the Qantas Airway Flight 32 Airbus A380 engine failure and the subsequent events. Aside from the interesting circumstances, this demonstrates Cockpit Resource Management. What especially caught our eye was at the end, when the Captain made comment of automation vs human crews. With discussion from time-to-time about having one pilot, no pilots or someone on the ground controlling the airplane (as with a drone), this is why we like having real people in the cockpit. Qantas 32 is a good example of of how pilots on the scene vs human monitoring on the ground is the much better way.
https://youtu.be/vbDqpD80_u0
Bjorn’s Corner: hot summer, hot engines
By Bjorn Fehrm
17 July 2015, ©. Leeham Co: It is summer in south of Europe and we have had over 30°C/86°F for weeks. It makes one realize the conditions where the engines have to work over their flat rating point in the Middle East.
Aircraft engines are a bit fidgety. They don’t like temperature although they are made to sustain that their hottest parts, the nozzle and first turbine after the combustor, gets scalded to 1700°C/3,092°F or more.
Go down to the very back end of the engine and we come to where the key engine parameter, EGT (Exhaust Gas Temperature), is measured. It determines a lot of things, among them the time the engine stays on wing. Things are typically 700°C/1,832°F cooler here and this is where a reliable temperature measurement probe can be placed. Based on its values, the total health of the engine’s core is determined. It is also a key input whether the engine shall be throttled back in a hot take-off like in the Middle East.