By Leeham Co EU
We’ve seen it for decades: the War of Words between Airbus and Boeing around their competing aircraft. It hasn’t taken long for the WOW to emerge over the prospective A330neo. Only a few months ago, Boeing was muted in its assessment about the NEO and its response. No longer.
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For the 200- to 300-seat segment the WOW warning was raised Sunday at Doha, Qatar, in advance of the IATA Annual General Meeting, and no doubt it will stay aloft until this year’s Farnborough Air Show, where the formal launch of the A330neo is expected (as if anyone is doubting after Sunday).
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The start
As Aviation Week reports from the eve of the IATA AGM, John Leahy, Airbus’ chief operating office-customers, threw down the gauntlet by claiming an A330neo economics would be “unbeatable” and its “cash operating cost would equal 787-9.” Boeings counterpart John Wojick countered “at no price can it compete with the 787-10”.
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Of course, that’s not what Leahy claimed. Comparisons have been between the A330-300 and 787-9, not the 787-10.
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What it is all about
After our New Year’s analysis showed that there was a real case for an A330neo (A330neo prospect gains traction) we spent a further four months on the case, digging deeper and deeper. The result was put in our report The Business Case about the A330neo, a 60-page study which took a deep dive into the economics of the A330neo vs the A330 Classic and the Boeing 787-8/9. We did not examine the neo vs the 787-10 because these are different category airplanes, as Boeing’s Wojick should know full well.
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In an apples-to-apples comparison, we found the A330neo significantly narrows, but does not entirely close, the operating cost gap between the A330 Classic and Boeing’s new airplane. Airbus can close the gap and achieve an advantage, however, if it lowers the price of the A330neo to a level the 787 can‘t give. This is central to Leahy’s argument, which is used for the A330 Classic but achieved only with the most favorable assumptions for the Airbus airplane
To summarize:
Boeing CEO said there will be no more “moonshots” at Boeing when it comes to future airplane development. Airbus says it will focus on derivatives rather than new airplanes.
After the program debacles of the Airbus A400M and A380 (plus the development cost of the A350) and Boeing 747-8 and 787, we can appreciate the sentiment. However, Boeing CEO Jim McNerney’s statement that doing a new airplane every 25 years is, essentially, bad policy, is disheartening.
Boeing used to be the shining example in the US of innovative technology: The B-17, B-29, B-47, B-52, 707, the versatile 727, the 747, the ETOPS 767, the incredibly reliable 777 and now the 787 (even as troubled as it has been). The 737, best-selling airplane that it is, was not a ground-breaking technology and neither was the 757. But each became solid stable mates in the 7 Series line up.
Airbus also offered ground-breaking technology and concepts. Fly-by-wire. Common cockpits across the family line. Re-engining the A320 family (forcing a reluctant Boeing to do the same with the 737). A technologically impressive A380, even if it’s hardly been the sales success Airbus hoped for.
Innovation and the willingness to taking industrial-leading chances make a company great.
Sam Pearlstein, the aerospace analyst at Wells Fargo, predicted a production rate cut today in a research note for the Boeing 777.
An announcement could come as early as this year, he writes.
Pearlstein, one of our favorite aerospace analysts, reached a conclusion similar to one we came to a few months ago: Boeing won’t be able to sustain the current production rate of 8.3/mo to bridge the 777 Classic to the 777X, which has a planned entry into service in 2020 (Boeing would like to advance this to 2019).
Pearlstein initially predicts a rate cut to 7/mo, followed by another to 5/mo. We believe a cut to 5/mo will be required, though a “step-down” rather than a “leap-down” along the lines Pearlstein suggests is certainly possible and would be in keeping with Boeing practice.
Pearlstein writes:
Analysis. We estimate Boeing will need to see demand for 600 777s (i.e., six years at 100/yr) to sustain current build rates until the 777X is available. Our analysis suggests Boeing could come up ~125 units short of this target. This conclusion is highly sensitive to assumptions of global capacity growth, aircraft retirement rates, and competitive dynamics with the Airbus A350-1000. In other words, actual demand could be somewhat better – or worse – than our forecast.
Rate Cut Likely. Assuming our estimates are reasonable, Boeing will have to cut the 777 build rate – with an announcement possible as early as year-end. We would expect the initial cut to revert back to the previous 7/mo; should the order skyline continue to show a large gap, a subsequent cut to 5/mo is possible.
Boeing CEO Jim McNerney said on the 1Q2014 earnings call that he believes full rate production can be maintained to the 777X EIS when current firm orders, options, letters of intent and sales campaigns are considered. We don’t think so.
Airbus’ Enders: Airbus Group CEO Tom Enders muses about what he will do when his current term ends in two years. He might seek another three year term as CEO or he could move on. In the Byzantine structure at Airbus, the CEO’s job rotates between a German and Frenchman with the opposite nationality heading Airbus (the airplanes) during the term. Enders has made great progress in bringing Airbus Group into the real corporate world and away from the government meddling that has proved the bane of the company’s existence. He still has things to accomplish, including a more traditional executive office structure regardless of nationalities and term limits.
Smooth A320neo introduction: Meantime, Enders says it’s imperative that the introduction next year of the A320neo go smoothly and that A350 program still has “challenges.” The A350 is supposed to enter service by the end of this year.
Ex-Im Bank: The Seattle Times editorialized that the Ex-Im Bank authorization should be renewed by Congress, and as readers know, we agree. Boeing will be put at a disadvantage to Airbus because the European Union Export Credit Agencies will continue to provide ECA financing for Airbus. Write your Congressman. Ex-Im is more than just Boeing, too.
Delta vs Alaska: The air wars continue between giant Delta Air Lines and Alaska Airlines, the smallest of the US legacy carriers. Delta announced it is adding more service to Seattle, Alaska’s largest hub, on routes that compete with Alaska. The latter announced it will increase service by 11% in Seattle, mostly (but not entirely) to cities that don’t directly compete with Delta.
As some customers press Airbus and Boeing for a replacement for the Boeing 757-200W used on selected trans-Atlantic, long-thin routes, Flightglobal floated a suggestion that that the Boeing 767-300ER might be a possible replacement.
The last passenger 767 was delivered this month. The line remains open with the 767-300ERF and the early stages of the USAF KC-46A tanker. A cut-price 763ER might be cheap enough to offset the operating cost disadvantage, or so the theory goes.
The 763ER is the right size in a three-class configuration—218 seats–and will be in production for many years to come due to the KC46 production line. We know Boeing sold the 763ER for a very low price in connection with compensation for the 787 delays, and we know that at a very low price, the 763ER economics do match the 787’s operating costs. But how does this stack up against the 757 in Flightglobal’s hypothesis?
Not very well. We did a quick economical analysis with our proprietary model.
The National Transportation Safety Board released a report on its investigation of the Boeing 787 battery fire on the Japan Air Lines 787 and the smoking battery on the ANA 787 in January 2013. The Federal Aviation Administration grounded the 787s for more than three months while a fix was designed.
The NTSB press release summarizing its points is here.
The agency’s 12-page letter of Safety Recommendations is here. Additional information is here.