Leeham News and Analysis
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Leeham News and Analysis
- Does an A220-500 need a new wing and engines? Part 4. July 3, 2025
- GE testing of giant GE9X engine aims for maturity at entry into service June 30, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 28. June 27, 2025
- Parent agency, FAA often at odds as politics outweighs safety June 26, 2025
- Electric Flight and the Ugly Duckling June 25, 2025
Emirates’ 615 seat A380, is it more economical?
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
Nov. 11, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Emirates Airline showed off its newly delivered two class A380 at this week’s Dubai Air Show. With a record 615 seats, this is the densest A380 that has been delivered by Airbus.
Emirates have reached this record seat number by replacing the first class cabin (and showers) with economy seats. Part of the business area has gone as well. What remains on the Premium side are 58 of the well known lie-flat seats and the ubiquitous Emirates bar.
The aircraft is aimed at high density destinations which are reached within a 12 hours limit, therefore the aircraft has no crew rest facilities.
The question is, what improvements in seat-mile costs does this configuration bring and how does it stack up against a similarly configured Boeing 777-300ER or 777-9?
Will there be a change in the economical pecking order compared to the more classical long range configurations that we looked at December last year?
We used our proprietary performance model to find out.
Summary:
- To be fair to all aircraft, we equipped them with similar high density two class cabins.
- We also kept the ratio of business-to-economy seats the same for all cabins.
- The result is high capacity workhorses that are used for flying passengers and cargo at sector lengths of up to 12 hours. Consequently, none of the aircraft have crew rest facilities.
- We then looked at fuel efficiency, Cash Operating Costs and Direct Operating Costs for these long-haulers now given a mostly mid-haul work scope.
Embraer’s fundamental advantages
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Introduction
With the first Embraer E-Jet E2 under assembly, we take a look at the E1 and E2 programs in the run-up to 
roll-out of the E-190 E2 next year and projected Entry Into Service (EIS) in 2018.
Summary
- Broad customer base gives Embraer a major advantage against new competitors.
- More than 2,300 ERJs, E-Jets in service.
- More than 1,100 E-Jets in service.
- Broad product support a key advantage.
Do the Boeing 787 sums add up, Part 2
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
Oct. 22, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: This is an update on our article about Boeing 787 program costs now that Boeing has presented its 3Q 2015 results.
It was a good quarter for Boeing with solid performance in revenue and in cash generation. The results for deferred costs for the 787 program were also above Boeing’s guidance (guidance: same losses as for 2Q), with a $577m increase in deferred costs instead of $790m for 2Q.
Boeing’s CFO, Greg Smith, commented that this result and also gave new values for when the 787 goes cash positive and what the learning effects are for the 787-8 and 787-9. We update our analysis based on these further data points.
Summary:
- Boeing reports less deferred costs than expected but Greg Smith put this in perspective in his comments. We decode what this means for the deferral curve for the 787.
- Smith also gave new information regarding learning effects for 787-8 and 787-9 and when the 787 goes cash positive. We check if this changes any of our assumptions in our original article.
Do the Boeing 787 sums add up?
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
Oct. 19, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Boeing presents its Q3 2015 results on Wednesday. This is a hotly awaited presentation, as analysts then will get another data point in their quest to understand if the 787 program will ever turn a profit.
We believe it is pretty clear that the program will not record an overall profit with the cost of development as well as production costs included. With a development cost of close to $20bn, this is to ask for too much. The question is if the production over the first 1,300 units can turn a profit. This is also under scrutiny.
Boeing employs program accounting for the production phase of an aircraft program and now, 25% into the accounting period for the 787, the accumulated deferred costs are such that it is questionable if future deliveries can compensate.
We take a look at the present state and what Boeing has said about the future. Based on this information, we can deduce if it is probable that Boeing can turn $32bn of deferred cost for the 787 into a profit by 2022.
Summary:
- We analyze Boeing’s information around its deferred production cost for the 787 and show how many analysts have misunderstood what has been said.
- Based on the Boeing information, we can deduce the present production cost level, learning curves and when production costs go below the assumed average in the accounting block.
- We also show what the delivery mix from 787-8 and 787-9 to 787-9 and 787-10 will mean for margins in the program.
- Finally, we judge whether Boeing will turn the corner on production cost and get the accounting block to a black zero (or better).
Delta Air sees 777 surplus developing
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Oct. 14, 2015, © Leeham Co.: Delta Air Lines sees a major surplus of young Boeing 777s developing in the near term as key operators plan to let the aircraft go from
leases or retirements. The looming surplus makes it more likely that increased pressure on Boeing’s efforts to sell new 777s, and to sell them at reasonable margins, will become increasingly difficult.
Goldman Sachs, the investment bank, sees Delta’s comments as further evidence supporting the likelihood there will be a sharp production rate reduction as early as 2017, perhaps down to six/mo.
Separately, Bernstein Research’s aerospace analyst Doug Harned, also see 777 rates coming down to the equivalent of 6.5/mo in 2017, six in 2018 and five in 2019. The first 777X isn’t scheduled for delivery until 2020, when Harned predicts only five deliveries of the X.
Analysis: Airbus A350 production and accounting strategy
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
Oct. 12 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Airbus is ramping up the A350 program at a rather slow pace. For the first year of production, 2015, it plans 15 deliveries and “a little more than double that” for 2016. Airbus is also introducing “contract accounting” for the first A350 deliveries.
As initial costs for producing a new aircraft model can be 400%-500% higher than the ultimate run-in production cost, Airbus introduces this novel accounting principle to maintain 2015 and 2016 profits “at about the same level.”
We use our aircraft model to understand why Airbus is ramping the A350 as it is and why it uses “contract accounting.” We also show what would be the effects on Airbus profits should A350 not ramp slowly and Airbus use special accounting to keep group quarterly results from surprises.
Summary:
- The ramp of production of a new aircraft type is extremely expensive. Initial costs exceed what the customer pays for the aircraft with 400%-500%. This can generate company losses if no special actions are taken.
- We use our aircraft model to show what has been done for the A350 program and why.
- The wish to have a steady quarterly profit has forced Airbus to use the same accounting practices that is Boeing’s way to keep profits looking good, but with a shorter duration.
- We explain how this accounting works and what it will mean for Airbus profits.
Evaluating airliner performance, Part 4
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
Oct. 05 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In the final part of our series about comparing and evaluating economic and operational performance of airliners, we will combine the different Cash Operating Costs (COC) with the capital and insurance costs to form the Direct Operating Costs (DOC).
We will also look at typical values for the different costs that make up the DOC for a single aisle Boeing 737 or Airbus A320 aircraft and a typical dual aisle Boeing 787 or Airbus A330neo aircraft.
Summary:
- We describe the cost that form an aircraft’s capital costs and how these differ between an ownership or a lease model.
- When forming the Direct Operating Cost (DOC). The low fuel price of $1.50 per US Gallon has lowered the fuel’s part of DOC to around 20% for single aircraft and 30% for dual aisle aircraft on their typical mission types.
- This means that other costs types in the DOC gets a more dominant role. We show which are the costs to look out for.
- Finally we give the typical CASM (Cost per Available Seat Mile) values for single and dual aircraft in the market.