Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Teamsters, Boeing have a new contract April 29, 2025
- Boeing wants to remarket China’s airplanes. It’s costly and time consuming. April 28, 2025
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 19. April 25, 2025
- How good is the C929? Part 2. April 24, 2025
- Boeing First Quarter Results Update: China is 10% of the backlog, with 500 in “Unidentified” April 24, 2025
With 787 FAL closing and 747 production ending, what does Boeing do with massive space in Everett?
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By Scott Hamilton and Bryan Corliss
Introduction
Oct. 1, 2020, © Leeham News: Boeing is expected to announce as early as today that it will consolidate the 787 final assembly lines into one at its Charleston (SC) plant.
Footprint of Boeing Everett final assembly building. This map is somewhat outdated but a current one is not available. Source: Seattle Times.
Reuters reported last week the decision to consolidate production in Charleston was made. The Wall Street Journal Tuesday night also reported this decision, saying the decision could be announced this week.
The Everett (WA) line is expected to close as production of the 787 falls below seven a month. Boeing previously announced the rate will fall from a peak of 14/mo to 6/mo by 2022.
With the closure of the 747 line in Everett slated for 2022, this will open huge bays in Everett. Nearly half the world’s largest building by volume will be empty. Given lower production rates because of the COVID-19 pandemic, the 777 lines will be woefully underutilized.
Overhead costs probably can’t be absorbed by the remaining low-rate production 767/KC-46A and 777 lines. Boeing warned in its 2Q2020 10Q SEC filing that the 787 and 777 lines face a forward loss depending on production rates of other lines.
With no New Midmarket Airplane (NMA) being contemplated to fill the empty bays, what can Boeing do to utilize these massive spaces and retain profitability of Everett?
A radical solution is moving the 737 line from Renton to Everett. This means Renton would close well before the 2033 date LNA predicts and selling off the property for commercial development.
Related stories
The engine manufacturers worst hit by the pandemic
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By Bjorn Fehrm
Introduction
September 28, 2020, © Leeham News: The worldwide COVID-19 pandemic is shaking the air travel and airliner manufacturing industries like no crisis before.
More than 9/11, the oil crisis of 1973 or 2005 or the financial crisis of 2008. The problems for the airlines and the airframe OEMs are on the front pages of the world’s media.
The part of the airliner industry that is not so visible but is perhaps hardest hit, is the engine industry. Its weird business model amplifies the effects of the crisis.
Summary
- Airframe OEMs lose money on the first hundreds of aircraft produced.
- When they announce “black numbers”, it means the per aircraft losses stop. It doesn’t mean the aircraft program is positive.
- For engine OEMs, it’s worse. They never reach ‘black numbers” on engine production. Their only money makers are old engine programs that fly a lot.
Sunset of the Quads, Part 8. The A380, 747-8i and 777-9 compared.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
Introduction
September 24, 2020, © Leeham News: Airbus was disturbed for decades by Boeing’s rein of the Very Large Aircraft (VLA) airliner segment with the 747. It was determined Boeing used this dominance to outmaneuver Airbus in different situations.
Airbus needed an aircraft in this market segment, bigger and better than Boeing’s. The result was the A380, the world’s largest passenger aircraft. We know how this developed today, where the COVID pandemic finally killed the segment for Very Large Aircraft. But how good was it, and where were the weaknesses?
We compare the A380, 747-8i, and Boeing’s up and coming 777-9 to find out.
Summary
- The A380 outclassed the Boeing 747-400 efficiency-wise, as it was a 30 years younger design.
- The updated 747, the 747-8i narrowed the gap to the A380, but if both could be filled the A380 stayed ahead.
- The 777-9 is 15 years younger in design than the A380, and it shows. It is significantly more economical in operation than the A380.
- Throughout its career, the A380 had a graver problem than its efficiency. It was simply too big for a market that went for frequency instead of large departures.
Sunset of the Quads, Part 7, The A380
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
All Nippon Airways’ Flying Honu A380 livery
Sep. 17th, 2020, © Leeham News: Last week, we compared the economics of the A340-600 and the 777-300ER on the Los Angeles to Shanghai route. We now turn our attention to the last major bet on a quad-engine aircraft, Airbus’ Superjumbo A380.
Summary
- An extended market study to go after the Queen of the Skies;
- Supersized launch and development;
- A program on life support for several years;
- What went wrong;
- Analyzing two-stage Boeing response on a trunk route.
Sunset of the Quads, Part 6. The A340-600 versus the 777-300ER.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
Introduction
September 10, 2020, © Leeham News: The Airbus A340-600 was designed to challenge Boeing’s hold of the large, long-haul jets. With a capacity 60 seats above the previous largest Airbus jet, the A340-300, and a 7,500nm range, it should put Airbus firmly on the long-haul map.
The A340-600 would be flying its 350 passengers as long and for a lower cost than the 20 seats larger Boeing 747-400, the then-largest long-haul Boeing jet. It would have worked hadn’t Boeing upgraded the 777-300 to the 777-300ER and surpassed the spec. How much better did that make the 777-300ER when it arrived in 2004?
Summary
- The A340-600 could take almost as many passengers as the Boeing 747-400 and fly these to the same distance.
- In addition, it loaded more LD3 cargo containers and burned only three-quarters of the fuel of a 747-400.
- But the advantage of the A340-600 was shortlived. Only two years later Boeing responded with the 777-300ER which bettered the Airbus on almost all accounts.
Twin-aisle leasing market challenges
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Sep. 7, 2020, © Leeham News: The timeline for a passenger traffic recovery remains uncertain. The IATA does not expect passenger traffic to return to pre-COVID-19 levels until 2024. Leeham Co. predicts that it will take four to eight years before traffic returns to pre-COVID-19 levels.
Long-haul markets, where airlines almost exclusively operate twin-aisle aircraft, witnessed the sharpest drop in passenger traffic. As outlined in a previous article, airlines already retired significant numbers of older aircraft. Due to lingering travel restrictions, those markets should be the slowest to recover to pre-pandemic levels.
Ishka, the UK-based appraisal company, outlined the sharp drop in aircraft lease and purchase prices since the beginning of the pandemic. Unsurprisingly, twin-aisle aircraft are among the worst affected. There are virtually no takers for second-hand widebody passenger aircraft now.
Separately, Airbus and Boeing decreased their passenger twin-aisle production rates from a combined 28 to 15 per month from next year: 787 at six, A350 at five, 777 and A330 at two each.
Given the extent and expected duration of the drop in long-haul passenger traffic, LNA analyzes the factors that will influence leasing rates in the twin-aisle market this decade.
Summary
- Current in-service widebody fleet;
- Lease expiration timelines;
- Some models more exposed than others;
- The rationale for current twin-aisle production rates;
- Major factors outside airlines’ and lessor’s control.
Sunset of the Quads, Part 5
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Sep. 3rd, 2020, © Leeham News: Last week, we compared the economics of the A340-300 and the 777-200ER on the Paris to San Francisco route. We now turn our attention to Airbus’ larger long-range aircraft, the A340-600.
Credit: Virgin Atlantic Airways
The 30% larger A340-600 was developed in the last year of the 1990s to compete with Boeing’s 777-300ER, then in development.
Summary
- Offering airlines a full product suite;
- A340-600 launch and development;
- Quad vs. twin-engine long-range operations;
- Disappointing commercial performance;
- A long-haul trunk route.
European Regionals Face Hostile Operating Environment
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By Kathryn B. Creedy
Third in a Series. Previous articles:
- The future of regional jets is limited by choices, Scope Clause
- US Regional Consolidation Began Before Covid
Introduction
Aug. 31, 2020, (c) Leeham News: European regionals face far greater challenges than Covid and, sadly, much of what is happening to the industry is beyond its control. The result is similar to failures seen in the U.S. Flybe’s recent loss resulted from pre-Covid problems which also led to the pre-Covid failures of such airlines as Flybmi and Cobalt.
The failures illustrate, however, the three reasons why European regionals are so fragile – low-cost competition, geography, and challenging government policy.
Flybe is just the latest of many regionals to cease operations owing to harsh conditions in Europe.
Summary
- Government Policies Hardest on Regionals
- LCC Competition Challenging
- Consumer Protections Crushing
- Turboprops Have Large Role
Sunset of the Quads, Part 4.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
Introduction
August 27, 2020, © Leeham News: After presenting Boeing’s and Airbus’ first 300 seater long-range widebodies, the 777-200ER and A340-300 in Part 3, we now fly them both on the route Paris to San Fransisco to understand their economics.
The A340-300 was first on the market, but when the 777-200ER arrived amid changed ETOPS rules, the four holer found the twin a difficult competitor. We use our airliner performance model to understand why.
Summary
- The A340-300 has about the same payload-range performance as the later introduced 777-200ER.
- Its economics is competitive with the 777-200ER, yet sales dried up when the 777-200ER became available. We explain why.
R&D spending at Boeing plunges; Airbus yet to kick in
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By Scott Hamilton
Introduction
Aug. 24, 2020, © Leeham News: Research and development spending at Boeing Commercial Airplanes declined 21% in the first half this year compared with 2019.
From 2017 through 2019, BCA’s R&D spending declined 13%.
During the first half this year, Airbus Commercial airplanes R&D spending declined 1%. From 2017-2019, R&D spending increased 31%.
Boeing’s decline in 2019 vs 2018 and the first half of 2020 vs 2019 clearly reflects the grounding of the 737 MAX.
The flat spending in 2017-2018 reflects Boeing’s corporate approach of keeping R&D spending level while returning 100% of free cash flow to shareholders.
Airbus, on the other hand, was aggressively pursuing green aviation R&D, driven by a European Union that is more dedicated to green aviation than the USA is.
Summary
- COVID-19 related R&D spending cuts may not be fully seen until the third quarter.
- Boeing suspended R&D spending on the New Midmarket Airplane in January. Coupled with MAX grounding pressure, Boeing’s spending was already depressed.
- Airbus said it was suspending all R&D except for the A321XLR after the global COVID devastation on air passenger demand.
- Airbus historically outspends Boeing in R&D.