Bombardier’s onerous $500m loss demystified

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

May 2, 2016, © Leeham Co: Bombardier announced a game-changing order from Delta Air Lines for its C Series program last week. In the midst of the celebration and well wishing came the news that this order, one to Air Canada and seven firmed up options to airBaltic, would result in a charge of $500m next quarter.

CS100 for Delta

Figure 1. C Series in the livery from Delta Air Lines. Source: Bombardier.

One analyst wrote in the wake of the Delta deal that “I understand that to get Delta and Air Canada you need to give attractive pricing, but that it would cost Bombardier $500m is a bit stiff.”

The comment shows that at least this analyst had no idea about the realities of aircraft programs financials. The announced onerous loss is nothing special; it is business as usual.

Summary

  • Bombardier’s accounting is according to International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) rules. These say that one must announce the results of a contract on the company’s financials at the time of contract closure.
  • Consequently, BBD informed in the 1Q2016 report that: “In conjunction with the closing of these firm purchase agreements, we expect to record an onerous contract provision of approximately $500 million as a special item in the second quarter of 2016.
  • Note that it says “provision” and not loss. Further, the provision will have no effect on 2016 profits or cash flow. This is a non-cash charge.
  • In fact, the $500m provision is nothing special; it’s part of business as usual. We explain why.

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Can Bombardier extend CS300 to a CS500? Part 3.

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

April 25, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: We will now finish our series where we look into how big an undertaking a CS300 stretch to a 150 seater would be for Bombardier.

The C Series existing models, the CS100 and CS300, were designed with the CS300 as the main family member. That makes a stretch to a CS500 a pretty straight-forward job from a wing perspective, only minor adjustments are needed.

The problem area for the stretch is the fuselage. The C Series is a five abreast aircraft and at 150 seats the aircraft will have more than 30 seat rows. The resulting long fuselage limits the available rotation angle at takeoff.

Having discussed the different actions that can be taken to handle this problem in Part 2, we will now check the implications for the takeoff field length with our performance model. The model will also show if the engine takeoff thrust needs to be increased.

Finally, we will use the model to estimate the fuel consumption and the range of a CS500 derivative.

Summary

  • A CS500 derivative made from the CS300 is a pretty straight-forward stretch project.
  • Special care has to be taken with the risk for tails strikes from a longer fuselage.
  • With the discussed actions in place, the field performance of a CS500 is still very good, even though it can’t compete with a CS300.
  • The range would be less than a CS300 but the aircraft would still be capable of five hour missions.
  • Fuel consumption would be higher per trip but lower per seat than a CS300. It would give existing 150 seaters strong competition on efficiency.

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Can Bombardier extend CS300 to a CS500? Part 2.

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

April 20, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: Last week we started our analysis to see whether Bombardier could stretch their C Series aircraft program from two members covering 100 to 135 passengers (in two class configuration) into a three aircraft family that would cover up to the main segment of the present single aisle market, the 150-160 seat segment.

We found that the main problem area seems to be the margin for rotation at take-off with a longer CS500 fuselage, a similar problem that affects the Boeing 737 MAX 9. There are several ways to attack such a problem in an aircraft like the C Series. We will now investigate the different options and what influence these would have to the cabin capacities for such an aircraft.

Summary

  • To create a CS500 that would cover the main single aisle seating segment (that of 150-160 seats two class), Bombardier would have to do rather modest changes to the present CS300.
  • The stretch would introduce a longer fuselage but the wing could stay pretty much the same.
  • The longer fuselage brings some challenges. The C Series has the wing and therefore main landing gear in a forward position for efficiency reasons. This limits the rotation angle for a longer CS500.
  • We go through the options for handling this problem and its consequences for the CS500 cabin capacity.

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Bombardier’s Delta deal looking good, but don’t celebrate yet

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Introduction

Air Baltic CS300

Air Baltic will be the first operator of the Bombardier CS300. Source: Bombardier.

April 18, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Bombardier, if it didn’t dominate the news cycle in commercial aviation last week, must have come close. Consider:

  • The Wall Street Journal, and then Bloomberg, reported that BBD was near to winning a big order for 75+50 from Delta Air Lines for its C Series.
  • Reuters reported that BBD rejected demands from the Canadian federal government in Ottawa as conditions for investing US$1bn in the company. (Officials tried to walk this back some, saying talks continue.)
  • The head of corporate strategy for BBD came forward to forcefully argue for the investment as good for taxpayers, breaking what largely has been a cone of silence over the perceived merits of a deal
  • The US$1bn the Quebec provincial government agreed to invest last year remains unfunded.
  • BBD stock, which last year dropped to less than C$1, threatening the listings on the Canadian exchanges, jumped to C$1.75 at one point in anticipation of a Delta order.

While on balance, it seems likely Delta will order the C Series, Bombardier has been down this road before. Only a few months ago, the market and others were excited over the prospect that BBD was close to landing an order from United Airlines, only to see Boeing swoop in and grab the deal.

Summary

  • This is the second try at a major contract with Delta Air Lines.
  • The primary competition is against Embraer, not Airbus or Boeing.
  • We revisit our Skyline Risk Assessment, dormant for the extended period in which BBD had no sales of the C Series.

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Can Bombardier extend CS300 to a CS500?

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

April 14, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: Bombardier is working hard to get additional mainline airline customers for its C Series project. The latest discussion is whether Delta Air Lines would replace its fleet of Boeing MD-88s with the C Series.

CS300

Figure 1. C Series largest model, CS300. Source: Bombardier.

In this context, it’s also discussed if the largest model, the CS300, Figure 1, is large enough for Delta. This aircraft seats 135 passengers in a two class configuration and up to 160 passengers in an all economy high density version.

The question is whether this is sufficient for Delta and other mainline customers, or if a still larger version is needed in the program, the oft-discussed CS500. We decided to use our proprietary aircraft model to see if a CS500 would be straight forward for Bombardier to develop, should Delta or any other customer ask for a three model C Series program.

Summary

  • The C Series aircraft program was developed with the CS300 as the main model. The wing, engine and landing gear were dimensioned with the CS300 in mind.
  • The CS100 is a shrink of the CS300, and not vice versa (the CS300 a stretch of the CS100).
  • A tentative CS500 stretch if therefore a first stretch of the program’s main model and not a double stretch of a CS100.
  • This is evident when one starts to analyze how a CS500 would be designed. There are rather modest changes that need to be done to create an extended model that seat up to 180 passengers.

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Why Boeing won’t take a charge on 787s

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Introduction

Boeing 787-9. Source: Boeing.

April 11, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Boeing has $29bn in deferred production costs and another $3bn in deferred tooling costs for its 787. The accounting block, for its program accounting, is a record 1,300 aircraft. Many Wall Street analysts are skeptical whether Boeing will ever recover the huge deferred numbers.

Boeing insists it will.

Still, taking a charge of some number—as it has done twice for the 747-8 and twice for the 767-based KC-46A—is something Boeing repeatedly insists it doesn’t need to do.

Why not?

There are a few key reasons, say Wall Street analysts who follow Boeing: revenue, cash flow and the stock price.

Summary

  • Bank of America Merrill Lynch estimates Boeing needs to post a profit of $30m on each of the remaining 900 787s to be delivered to recover the deferred costs. LNC figures this number is higher.
  • Pricing pressure from Airbus makes it difficult to obtain this profit.
  • The deferred costs limit Boeing’s ability to price down to meet Airbus’ offers to customers.
  • Credit Suisse figures Boeing can recover only some $22bn of $29bn in deferred production costs.
  • Boeing warns in SEC filings a forward loss might be required.
  • But no forward loss is likely unless revenue falls short.

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Boeing has lost neo/MAX battle; time to refocus goals

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Introduction

April 4, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Boeing should forget about competing with Airbus for market share.

The Airbus A320neo. Airbus has won the single-aisle battle between the neo and Boeing 737 MAX. Boeing needs to refocus its goal. Photo via Google images.

Airbus already has won the neo/MAX battle. This is a battleground Boeing will not retake for the lives of these airplanes.

Airbus has led Boeing in wide-body, passenger airplane sales for most of the past several years. (Boeing smashes Airbus in wide-body cargo aircraft sales.) This sector will remain competitive.

Instead, Boeing should concentrate on profit margin and roll the dice on a clean-sheet, new single-aisle airplane as its best hope of recovering the dominance it long held over Airbus.

Summary

  • Airbus has won the single-aisle competition with the A320neo family. Boeing has no hope of catching up in the next 10 years.
  • Airbus is competitive in wide-body sales (excluding freighters). This is the new battleground.
  • Boeing should “maintain” 737 market share and focus on margin across the 7-Series instead.
  • Boeing’s hope to regain the leadership in the single-aisle sector is the next generation aircraft.

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Dreamliner cash positive or not?

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

31 March, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: Boeing will present its first quarter 2016 results in about three weeks. One area which will be carefully scrutinized by the aerospace analysts will be the progress of the 787 program towards making money instead of consuming it.

Boeing gives the detailed information about the health of the 787 program in the comments by Boeing’s CFO, Greg Smith during the quarterly conference call. In the last call, he puzzled the analysts (and us) by saying that the 787 program was cash positive in 4Q2015 yet the program increased its deferred production and tooling costs by $191m. This means it still pushed about $5m per aircraft into the balance sheet as production loss.

At the time we assumed that the 787-9 was cash positive whereas the 787-8 was negative. This was most probably correct but not the whole picture. With some further poking around we think we are the elusive loss making cash positive on its tracks.

It has to do with the peculiarities of program accounting.

Summary:

  • It’s important for the 787 program to start amortizing the $32b in deferred production and tooling costs that has been amassed.
  • The 787 production should be cash positive yet Boeing does not expect the deferred costs to be going down before 3Q
  • We explain how something can be cash positive yet still defer costs. The answer is to find in how program accounting defines what is the cost of goods sold.

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Sales slowing for larger, Airbus, Boeing twin-aisle jets

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Introduction

Boeing 777. Photo via Google images.

March 28, 2016, © Leeham Co.: A downturn in the order cycle, low fuel prices and backlogs extending to 2020 and beyond combine to reduce the likelihood of much in the way of wide-body orders this year, say commercial aviation officials.

A preference for smaller twin-aisle jets could also hurt sales of larger twin-aisle airplanes, according to observers.

These factors spell challenges for Airbus and Boeing for the A350-1000, the 777-300ER and the 777X.

Summary

  • “Nobody’s talking about the A350-1000 or the 777X,” says the president of a leading lessor.
  • Preference indicated for the smaller Boeing 787-9 over the larger 777-300ER for new routes.
  • Low fuel prices reduce the need for new technology jets.

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Aircraft programme cost

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

March. 21, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: There is quite a lot of talk about what a new aircraft program like Boeing’s Middle of the Market (MOM) would cost the airframe OEM to develop. Typical quotes are “it would cost them at least  $10bn.” When saying this, the person implies this is the program’s load on the company’s liquidity for that aircraft program.

This is not correct and we will now go through why. It might be true that the development of the aircraft cost $10bn. But the trouble is, this is not the only cost that will hit the OEM for this aircraft program.

Cost that one normally does not think about when talking about new aircraft programs can double the cash burden on the OEM.  Here’s why.

Summary:

  • What normally is labeled development cost is only to a part development.
  • About half of the cost is used to develop and manufacture the aircraft’s production tooling.
  • There is one major cost block that has been forgotten in a development cost discussion: initial production costs.
  • The initial production costs not covered by customer payments can double the cash burden for a company.

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