Analysis: Airbus A350 production and accounting strategy

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Oct. 12 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Airbus is ramping up the A350 program at a rather slow pace. For the first year of production, 2015, it plans 15 deliveries and “a little more than double that” for 2016. Airbus is also introducing “contract accounting” for the first A350 deliveries.

As initial costs for producing a new aircraft model can be 400%-500% higher than the ultimate run-in production cost, Airbus introduces this novel accounting principle to maintain 2015 and 2016 profits “at about the same level.”

We use our aircraft model to understand why Airbus is ramping the A350 as it is and why it uses “contract accounting.” We also show what would be the effects on Airbus profits should A350 not ramp slowly and Airbus use special accounting to keep group quarterly results from surprises.

Summary:

  • The ramp of production of a new aircraft type is extremely expensive. Initial costs exceed what the customer pays for the aircraft with 400%-500%. This can generate company losses if no special actions are taken.
  • We use our aircraft model to show what has been done for the A350 program and why.
  • The wish to have a steady quarterly profit has forced Airbus to use the same accounting practices that is Boeing’s way to keep profits looking good, but with a shorter duration.
  • We explain how this accounting works and what it will mean for Airbus profits.

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Evaluating airliner performance, Part 4

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Oct. 05 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In the final part of our series about comparing and evaluating economic and operational performance of airliners, we will combine the different Cash Operating Costs (COC) with the capital and insurance costs to form the Direct Operating Costs (DOC).

We will also look at typical values for the different costs that make up the DOC for a single aisle Boeing 737 or Airbus A320 aircraft and a typical dual aisle Boeing 787 or Airbus A330neo aircraft.

Summary:

  • We describe the cost that form an aircraft’s capital costs and how these differ between an ownership or a lease model.
  • When forming the Direct Operating Cost (DOC). The low fuel price of $1.50 per US Gallon has lowered the fuel’s part of DOC to around 20% for single aircraft and 30% for dual aisle aircraft on their typical mission types.
  • This means that other costs types in the DOC gets a more dominant role. We show which are the costs to look out for.
  • Finally we give the typical CASM (Cost per Available Seat Mile) values for single and dual aircraft in the market.

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Assessing the China market

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Introduction

Sept. 30, 2015, (c) Leeham Co.: The Boeing deals announced last week with China put the country into the spotlight about its commercial aviation ambitions.

For many, the various deals announced by Boeing raise alarm bells. For most, that fire horse already left the fire station. The smoke has been billowing out of China (or maybe that’s smog) for a long, long time.

Summary

  • Boeing announces 300 orders and commitments for China, though the company was vague about the details. We try to dissect what’s real and what’s smoke.
  • Additional deals announced by Boeing are driven by China’s pay-to-play approach to business.
  • Other OEMs, suppliers also have to pay-to-play.
  • China’s deals with Airbus and Boeing are only two elements of a national goal for commercial aerospace.
  • IP theft and technology transfer big concerns.

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Evaluating airliner performance, Part 3

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Sep. 28 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In the third part of our series about comparing and evaluating economic and operational performance of airliners, we will take a deeper look at how the cabin configuration can affect the evaluation result.

Airlines around the world show the operational performance and cost in many different formats. One of the more important is cost per transported passenger or per seat, such as operating cost per available seat mile (CASM). Cost per seat mile is also one of the key results of an aircraft evaluation.

To reach this number, the costs per flown aircraft mile is divided by the seat count of the aircraft. This is the reason why all OEMs try to cram as many seats as possible in their reference aircraft. In evaluations, they use any wiggle room in the evaluation specification to get their seat number up.

To make true apples-to-apples aircraft evaluations, it is therefore necessary that one understand where the OEMs cut corners in their cabin layouts if allowed so that one can hand them evaluation criteria that enables unbiased evaluations.

Summary:

  • We look at the most common methods for the OEMs to increase their seat counts.
  • We learn how to specify the different areas of the cabin to enable fair comparison configurations.
  • Finally, we discuss how much differences in cabin layout can affect a final result in an aircraft evaluation.

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Evaluating airliner performance, Part 2

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Sep. 24 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In the second part of our series about comparing and evaluating economic and operational performance of airliners, we look at the parts beyond fuel that make up the Cash Operating Costs (COC) for an airliner.

While fuel consumption, crew costs and aircraft maintenance costs can be evaluated in a way which closely resembles reality, other costs in the COC are too complex to model in their true form.

This is the case for underway or airway fees, landing fees and station fees. Here, just about every country/airport in the world has taken the liberty to invent its own charging principles and formulas.  With several hundred different formulae for these charges, the way out is to use industry-accepted approximation for these costs.

Summary:

  • We establish how crew cost are modeled for our evaluation missions, taking into account the complex world of work time regulations for pilots and cabin crew.
  • We also describe how we handle airframe and engine maintenance costs and how these get allocated to our missions.
  • Finally, we describe how the complex underway and landing/station costs are modeled with the accepted approximations these require.

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Evaluating airliner performance, part 1.

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Sep. 21 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Comparing and evaluating operational and economic performance of competing airliners is a complex task that requires analysis of thousands of parameters.

It’s not unknown for smaller airlines to have limited capability to undertake these difficult analyses. Accordingly, they often rely on the Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) for their analysis on behalf of the potential customer.

Unfortunately, the OEM’s have little incentive to provide an unbiased view of either their products nor those of their competitors.

Thorough evaluations require quite some preparations. If these preparations are not carried out correctly, the result can be biased to the extent that the evaluation method dictates which’s the best aircraft and not the most suitability aircraft for the task. We will in a series of articles cover how aircraft evaluations are done and how evaluation pitfalls can be avoided.

Summary:

  • Aircraft evaluations are made for all direct operating costs that can be linked directly to the operation of the airliner.
  • The costs can be divided in Cash Operating Costs (COC), which covers the operation of the aircraft and capital costs. Combined these costs constitute the Direct Operating Costs, DOC.
  • The OEMs produce data for all COC cost items, but they do that in their own way. To make the costs comparable one need to know and understand their assumptions and neutralize these through independent modeling of the costs.
  • We describe what these assumptions are and how to neutralize them.

 

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Airbus ‘confident’ engine makers can ramp up production

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Introduction

Sept. 17, 2015, © Leeham Co., Mobile (AL): Tom Enders, the chairman and CEO of Airbus Group, is “confident” engine makers can accommodate single-aisle airplane production ramp-ups being considered by Airbus and Boeing.

CFM makes about 50% of the engines on the A320 Family and has about 50% of the backlog for the New

Tom Enders, CEO of Airbus Group. Airbus photo.

Engine Option version. Pratt & Whitney has about the same market share for the NEO, depending on what month it is, with a large number of orders for which no engine has been selected.

Airbus and Boeing are each studying whether to ramp up production of the A320 and 737 families above the record rates already planned.

In an interview Sunday with Leeham News and Comment in advance of the A320 Final Assembly Line opening here, Enders said studies continue whether to take A320 production rates to 60 a month. Boeing is studying rates of 60-63 a month.

Summary

  • Decision whether to go to rate 60/mo should come by year end.
  • Suppliers, engine “partner” key to decision.
  • A380 sales “struggling,” but confidence remains.
  • More export sales for A400M program expected.

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Embraer CEO interview: oil prices, Brazil’s economy, China

Paulo Cesar, president and CEO of Embraer’s commercial aviation unit. Photo via Google images.

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Introduction

Part 3

Sept. 14, 2015, © Leeham Co. It’s only been three months since the Paris Air Show and there have been some significant developments in the world that have impact on commercial aviation:

  • Oil prices dropped from about $62/bbl to a low of $38 in mid-August and it’s climbed back to about $46 this week;
  • China devalued the Yuan;
  • The Brazilian economy has deteriorated and so has the domestic political situation; and
  • Some LCC airlines in Asia are feeling the strain of growth and weakening currencies.

We talked with Paulo Cesar, president and CEO of Embraer at the Paris Air Show on some of these topics. We caught up with him Sept. 2 in Seattle, revisiting these topics and talking about more.

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Boeing’s 767 revitalized as a MOM stop gap, Part 3

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Aug. 31 2015, ©. Leeham Co: After examining the characteristics of the Boeing 767 to serve the market segment that Boeing is studying for its Middle of the Market (MOM) requirement, the 225 passenger/5000nm sector, we will now finish the series by looking at how the 767 can be made economically more competitive.

We will study the influence of improved aerodynamics like Aviation Partners Boeing’s Split Scimitar Winglet for the 767. We will also look at what engine PIPs can provide and also look at what a re-engine could bring.

Finally we examine at what happens when we add crew costs, underway/landing fees and maintenance costs to form Cash Operating Costs (COC) followed by capital costs to form Direct Operating Costs (DOC).

Summary:

  • Boeing’s 767 has the right cross section for passenger transportation in the 225 passenger/5000nm segment.
  • Its wings and empennage are too large, however. We make them work harder by transporting the 767-300ER fuselage and passengers.
  • We also introduce aerodynamic and engine improvements. Still, the fuel consumption per seat mile is considerably higher than modern alternatives.
  • At a Cash Operating Cost and Direct Operating Cost level, the higher fuel consumption has less influence in today’s fuel prices. The result is that the 767-300ER becomes an interesting alternative as long as the fuel price stays low.

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A320 oversold in bridge from ceo to neo

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Introduction

Airbus A320neo. Source: Airbus

Sept. 7, 2015, © Leeham Co. Airbus is oversold in its A320 family positions as it transitions from the ceo to the neo, an analysis shows.

The first delivery of the A320neo is scheduled for December. Airbus plans to phase out the A320ceo family over two years (as does Boeing with the 737NG in favor of the 737MAX).

We analyzed the 737NG bridge to the 737MAX last week and concluded Boeing faces a production gap of between 100-200 aircraft, depending on how delivery dates of 737MAXes for Unidentified customers are scheduled. We indirectly received push back from Boeing on this, which we also address in today’s report.

Summary

  • Airbus is oversold in 2016 and 2017.
  • A gap appears in 2018, but this depends in part how “TBA” delivery dates are allocated for Unidentified customers.
  • Boeing says Options and Overbooked orders fill its apparent 737 gap.
  • We update our 737 production gap analysis to include Options and find a gap still exists.
  • Boeing wants to accelerate MAX deliveries from 2018 into 2017.

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