Ahead of the afternoon (EDT) press conference by the Department of Defense, Tanker War Blog is reporting that it appears DOD is going to have “an expedited” recompete.
Live Internet streaming coverage of the DOD press conference at 1pm EDT will be available on this Mobile TV station.
The Mobile Press Register has this blog item.
Breaking News, 845 AM PDT: We’re told that there will be a quick evaluation of the GAO concerns and that an award will be made by January.
Additional, 855 AM PDT: John Young at DOD replaces USAF’s Sue Payton as the Source Selection Authority.
Update, 1000 AM PDT: The press conference is about to begin. As we wait, here are a couple of take-aways from what we know at this time:
Robert Gates, Secretary of Defense, says that DOD will review all eight of the GAO protest items. John Young, as we reported earlier, becomes the new Source Selection Authority. A new advisory committee will be appointed to oversee the new process, and completion of the process will be by year-end.
The new Air Force chief noted that there is a need to rebuild confidence in the procurement process. He noted that the USAF successfully defended itself in more than 100 protest items, and therefore he does not conclude that the underlying procurement process is fatally flawed. However, with eight protest items being sustained, it is essential for the USAF to maintain confidence in the process.
Sue Payton and her team have been directed to be sure the USAF understands the GAO’s actions to position the Air Force for future competitions.
The rebid will not take into account the “industrial base” (jobs) or the WTO subsidy dispute between Airbus, Boeing, the US and the European Union.
Gates notes that this is the third time “we’ve gone at this.” He expressed confidence in the acquisitions team.
The press conference now takes a side trip to today’s Iranian missile test.
Back to the tanker:
Undersecretary John Young, who now will oversee the recompete, said the objective is to expedite the review. There will be a new draft Request for Proposals limited to the GAO points, and Boeing and Northrop will have the opportunity to submit requests for changes before a final RFP is issued.
Northrop’s contract is withdrawn for now, Young says.
Young says the oversight team that monitored the source selection was added during the process and did find things that were addressed during the competition, inferring that some issues arose before the oversight team was in place.
Young generally favors fly-offs, but in this case is not requiring it.
Young added that the December timeframe is a goal–meaning that, given the history of this procurement–the schedule may slip into next year. “We would seek to change the minimum number of requirements” in the new RFP, with the GAO findings and taxpayer costs paramount. Contractors may bring up other issues that could affect timing.
Young, significantly, clarified that Boeing may elect to offer a tanker based on the 777.
Government procurement mechanisms and laws don’t allow DOD to consider the WTO dispute.
Young hopes to issue to issue the draft RFP in late July or early August and make selection by end of year. Working against having two prototypes in a fly-off in this case isn’t required because these are derivatives of commercial airliners, and the best use of taxpayers’ money is to proceed along the route of an RFP in this case. Also, doing a fly-off would require reducing the budget and acquisition from 12-18 tankers a year to as few as six.
Looking long-term, Young says that he wants competition for the KC-Y follow-on program with “aggressive pricing.” He also said that in this rebid on the KC-X, perhaps Northrop and Boeing will sharpen their pricing even further.
We think it unlikely Boeing will offer only the 777, but it would be interesting to offer a mix of the KC-767 and KC-777. At the same time, since the USAF previously was clear that it wants to have only one airplane type for the KC-X competition, we believe that in the end Boeing will stick with the KC-767. That’s where all the money has been invested and all the effort and analysis made. Furthermore, Boeing has spent years saying the KC-767 is “right sized,” fits on the tarmac, is better for runway weights and so on. To change now would undermine everything that it has said up to this point.
It’s worth remembering that the USAF wants a “medium” tanker. According to the Rand Corp. Analysis of Alternatives, the KC-767 and KC-30 are medium tankers; the 777 is a “large” tanker.
But the rebid doesn’t mean that Boeing has any particular advantage. This is going to be a tough competition and, unfortunately, we expect more of the public and political campaigns (which we largely considered unseemly) to resurface. It would be nice if both sides would reign it in and just work with the USAF quietly.
Update, 300 PM PDT: Boeing had this to say about the DOD action:
“We welcome the decision by Defense Secretary Robert Gates not to proceed with the contract award to Northrop Grumman/EADS and to reopen the KC-X tanker competition. However, we remain concerned that a renewed Request for Proposals (RFP) may include changes that significantly alter the selection criteria as set forth in the original solicitation. As the Government Accountability Office reported in upholding our protest, we submitted the only proposal that fully met the mandatory criteria of the original RFP.
“We look forward to working with the new acquisition team as it reopens the competition, but we will also take time to understand the updated solicitation to determine the right path forward for the company.
“It’s encouraging that the Defense Department intends to take steps to ensure a fair and open competition that, among other things, fully accounts for life-cycle costs, such as fuel, to provide the most capable tanker at the best value for the American taxpayer.”
Northrop was more subdued:
“Northrop Grumman Corporation applauds Defense Secretary Gates and Under Secretary Young for recognizing that the acquisition of replacement refueling tankers for the Air Force should be put on a path toward quick closure. We are reviewing the decision to ensure the re-competition will provide both companies a fair opportunity to present the strengths of their proposals.
The United States Air Force has already picked the best tanker, and we are confident that it will do so again. Our men and women in uniform deserve nothing less.
The Northrop Grumman KC-45 tanker is needed now and is ready now.”
The Wall Street Journal Tuesday (July 8th) had an interesting piece about how the current high cost of fuel is adversely impacting the super long-haul flights.
The article raises questions about the viability of 15-18 hour flights in an era of $130bbl or more oil. In turn, this raises questions about the business models for the Boeing 787 and Airbus A350, which tout hub-busting 8,000nm ranges. The article suggests that shorter route segments make more sense.
The article is silent about the economics of the 8,000nm range A380 and its ability to carry more than 500 passengers, supplying the revenue for the super long-haul route.
Boeing’s Randy Tinseth, VP-marketing, comments in the article, arguing that the hub bypass remains an economic advantage. All-in-all, the piece makes for interesting reading.
Airbus and Boeing are virtually tied in year-to-date net orders, a position that is likely to change with next week’s Farnborough Air Show when both manufacturers may announce stronger-than-expected orders.
Through June 30, Airbus reported 487 net orders to Boeing’s 475.
In the ever-close single aisle category, Boeing now has taken the lead, with 354 net 737 sales to Airbus’ 323 net sales for the A320 family, a ratio of 52.3% to 47.7%. The companies have often flip-flopped the lead on this category.
For twin aisles, the leadership depends on the category within the category and also upon how these are divvied up.
For the large twin-aisle, Boeing continues to remain slightly ahead with 40 777s sold in the first half vs. 32 A350-900s. Airbus hasn’t sold a single A350-1000 so far this year. The ratio is 55.5% for Boeing to 45.5% for Airbus.
On medium-twin aisle airplanes, the picture is muddied a bit because there are the current generation twins (A330 and 767) plus the next generation twins (787 and A350-800). Here’s how this lines up:
A330P, 94: 47%
767, none: 0%
787, 79: 39.5%
A350-800, 27: 13.5%
This gives Airbus a 60.5% market share vs. 39.5% for Boeing. However, if one looks at only the 787 vs. the A350-800, Boeing has a 74.5% share vs. 25.5% for Airbus.
Boeing is handicapped by the fact that the 787 has serious program delays and as a result won’t deliver the last of the current orders of 900 until 2017 or 2020, depending on who you talk to. Thus, we’re told Boeing is currently not really offering the 787 for sale until the production rate stream becomes clear–a process that may take a couple of years. Airbus is limited in the ability to take advantage of this for the A350, which is also sold out to about 2017. There are more opportunities for the A330. Several lessors that ordered the A330F may switch early positions to the A330P and tack on an equal number of A330Fs to the back end of their orders. Some of these may be announced at Farnborough.
As for the 767, Boeing has yet to decide whether to up the production rate from the current one per month to 2 or 2 1/2 for airliners; and whether the oft-delayed USAF decision on the aerial tanker might be reversed, providing the need for even higher 767 rates.
Boeing did not sell any 767 freighters, while Airbus sold 11 A330Fs.
There was no change in the Very Large Aircraft category from May: Boeing has sold two 747-8s to three A380s YTD.
US Sen Patty Murray (D-WA), the most vocal critic of the USAF contract award to Northrop Grumman for the KC-45A, struck out in her request to have the US Commerce Department shoot down the Northrop claims of 48,000 jobs for the program. This compares with the 44,000 jobs claimed by Boeing for the KC-767.
Murray, along with Sen. Maria Cantwell (D-WA) and two other Senators, wrote Commerce on May 9 asking the Department to confirm–or debunk–Northrop’s claim of 48,000 jobs. The Senators correctly noted that Northrop claimed 25,000 jobs prior to the February 29 contract announcement and upped this a few weeks later, after the award, to 48,000 jobs.
The question was indeed a fair one, and one that we raised as well in this column on our Corporate website. We questioned the nearly doubling of jobs creation as well as how Northrop’s KC-30, with a stated US content of 58%, could generate more direct and indirect jobs than Boeing’s KC-767, with a stated US content of 85%.
Northrop, in our report, explained itself–something that Boeing never did–until a liberal think tank did a 15 page study we linked to in a previous report on this website. The think tank interviewed Boeing but not Northrop and came to the conclusion that both Boeing and Northrop overstated the jobs creation but that Northrop did a greater job of overstating than did Boeing.
Of all the jobs data we’ve seen, we tend to believe the think tank’s analysis more than any other, even if the report is open to criticism for failing to talk to Northrop.
That being said, Murray’s gambit to have Commerce debunk Northrop’s claim failed. Why is this significant? Because Murray has long challenged a 2003 Airbus claim that its US-sourced work supported 100,000 direct and indirect jobs. In 2003, Murray asked Commerce to verify the claim and, according to Murray, Commerce could not–inferring, if not outright suggesting, that Commerce studied the matter and could not confirm the Airbus claim.
The facts appear to be somewhat different.
In Murray’s May 9 letter, she refers to her 2003 inquiry of Commerce. Commerce, in its reply, acknowledges the 2003 inquiry and writes:
“As the Department stated in its 2003 letter…, estimates of the total job impact require a variety of assumptions about the direct and indirect impacts of production performed in the United States. Predicting the full impact…is extremely complicated…. Therefore, the Department of Commerce is not in a position to investigate the assumptions…especially when those claims are made in connection with the award of a US government contract by another Department.”
The correspondence between Murray and Commerce may be found here (Murray-Commerce), a three page PDF file.
The media campaign on both sides of the tanker debate continues as the US House of Representatives gears up to hold some hearings on the issue.
This item published in American Spectator is another in a series of op-ed pieces originating with the Center for Security Policy, which bills itself as a non-partisan think tank. The Center has consistently opposed the Northrop Grumman KC-30 in the competition and the subsequent award. None of the op-ed pieces has disclosed previous ties to Boeing. According to the 2005-2006 Annual Report (published every two years, so the 2007-2008 report isn’t out yet), a couple of Boeing officials served on the advisory boards to the Center. This taints the op-eds and the perceived independence of the Center. (Tanker War Blog is written by an employee of the Center, and while this blog doesn’t disclose the Boeing connection in its “About Us,” the blog has never made any pretense of objectivity.) The writings often have interesting and valid points–but the Center is not as independent as the image would have readers believe.
Human Events published this piece by former Gen. John Handy. Handy also supports the Boeing KC-767. It turns out that Handy’s name appears in a series of e-mails in connection with the 2002-2004 tanker scandal. He was one of many internal Air Force recipients copied on correspondence. The emails emerged when Sen. John McCain, now the presumptive Republican nominee for president, was investigating the first procurement.
Alabama Sen. Richard Shelby (R-Northrop) moved to block a bill introduced by several Members of Congress who are closely tied to Boeing that would all but guarantee a contract to Boeing. This item in The Mobile Press-Register explains the issue.
This analysis in the same newspaper takes a broader look at the Air Force procurement process. The tanker wasn’t the only example (in 2004 or 2008 ) of the Air Force muffing a procurement.
A 15 page study by the University of Buffalo raises concerns that technology transfer by Boeing to Japanese heavy industry, beginning with the 767 and peaking at the moment with the 787, sets up Japan’s emerging aerospace industry to become a serious rival.
The 787 production model has been a concern to the authors of the report since the 7E7 was announced in 2003. Furthermore, the Japanese government funding to the “heavies” is a violation of World Trade Organization rules, the authors report–to no small irony given Boeing’s complaints to the WTO about Airbus launch aid.
The paper is worth reading.
Innovation Analysis Group has a 15 minute podcast with Aviation Partners, which revealed that they are working on winglets for the Boeing 777–with a prediction that the product could be ready for installation within two years.
This follows the winglets for the Boeing 767, which Aviation Partners suggests will provide a 5%-7% fuel burn improvement.
If a similar improvement is made for the 777, this will close the gap between the 777 and the projected fuel savings for the Airbus A350. Airbus projects a 20 operating cost savings over the 777, although we recognize that the remaining 13%-15% advantage still is nothing to sneeze at.
Aviation Partners is also working with Airbus, though AP declined to discuss it. It’s known, however, that Airbus and AP are getting ready to test a winglet on the A320 family. AP did discuss the prospect of winglets for the A380–which would be 17 feet tall. The wingtip fences on the Airbus family are old technology, AP says.
The podcast may be found here.
Boeing delivered 126 aircraft in the second quarter, including 100 737s, six [correction–18–see the comment below] 777s, five 747s and three 767s. This is the equivalent of 33 737s a month (33.3 to be precise), six 777s, 1.6 747s and one 767.
Boeing has quietly been increasing the production rate of the 737 and has the capacity at its Renton plant to go to 40 a month–if the supply chain can perform. Boeing has been studying whether to go this high, which would match Airbus’ planned 2009 rate. There is a reluctance on the part of some to do so because of haunting memories of the 1997 737 production fiasco (though the current rate now exceeds the rate then), and also because of the emerging economic uncertainties.
But the 737 line is dramatically oversold in 2010, and Boeing is losing sales now because the line is essentially sold out to 2014. With a two year lead time required for suppliers to gear up, it would be mid-2010 before the production could be dramatically increased.
The 777 line average rate of six per month for 2Q08 is one less than the seven a month capacity of the Everett line. Boeing is offering the 777 as interim lift to accommodate airlines hurt by the 787 delays.
The 767 line, at one a month, has lots of room to grow if the supply chain is there to support it. But suppliers are pressed, running at full capacity serving Boeing and Airbus on other models. Increasing 767 parts production is problematic. Boeing has been thinking of going to 2-2.5 767s a month to support aggrieved 787 customers, and now with the uncertain prospect of winning some of all of the KC-X USAF tanker business, Boeing has some decisions to make. A full tanker award would be another 1-1.5 767s a month.