Leeham News and Analysis
There's more to real news than a news release.
Leeham News and Analysis
- Bjorn’s Corner: Air Transport’s route to 2050. Part 19. April 25, 2025
- How good is the C929? Part 2. April 24, 2025
- Boeing First Quarter Results Update: China is 10% of the backlog, with 500 in “Unidentified” April 24, 2025
- Boeing First Quarter Results: Tariffs, Return flights, $10.55bn asset sale April 23, 2025
- RTX Q1 2025 Earnings: GTF Talk Takes A Back Seat To Tariffs April 22, 2025
Boeing sees wide-body market recovery from 2020
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Introduction
Nov. 3, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Boeing may have solved its pressing problem of largely filling the production gap for the 747-8, but there is still a long way to go for the
Boeing 777X. Boeing’s view of the wide-body market has shifted. Once it thought a strong market through 2020. Now it sees recovery in demand from 2020. Boeing photo via Google images.
777.
Boeing Co. CEO Dennis Muilenburg said last week the production rate for the 777 Classic may need to come down another 1-2 per month from the previously announced 5.5/mo if sales don’t pick up.
Despite a pending order for 15 from Iran Air and the perpetual sales campaigns, Muilenburg otherwise painted a picture about wide-body demand that is anything but rosy.
Summary
- Boeing no longer sees strong demand for wide-bodies through this decade. Recovery won’t resume until the start of the next decade.
- Thus, successfully bridging the 777 Classic to the 777X becomes more challenging.
- Investors yawn at more potential 777 production rate cuts.
UPS order tops off 747-8 line through 2020
UPS Boeing 747-8F. Source: Boeing.
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Introduction
Oct. 31, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Last week’s order for 14 Boeing 747-8Fs and 14 options by UPS assures continuation of the program through 2020.
If options are exercised, and if previously announced deals with other customers finally are consummated, the program should continue at least well into the 2020 decade.
Summary
- UPS (but not Boeing) revealed the delivery timeline for the order.
- The mysterious Volga-Dnepr/AirBridgeCargo that was announced at the Paris and Farnborough air shows for up to 20 747-8Fs still hasn’t been firmed up. Only four are listed on the Boeing website this year.
- Iran Air will order four 747-8s under the reported terms of the agreement with Boeing. The US government blessed the deal recently.
- The first of three 747-8s for the presidential fleet is now scheduled for delivery in October 2017, it’s believed.
Seventeen new, derivative aircraft to see EIS through 2020
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Introduction
Delivery of the first Bombardier CS300, to AirBaltic, next week kicks off entry-into-service for 17 airplanes through 2020. Bombardier photo.
Oct. 20, 2016, © Leeham Co.: The past decade was a hive of activity as the Big Four OEMs launched new airplane programs and put the aircraft into service.
Airbus launched the A320neo, A330neo and A350 families. The A330neo is under production; the other two entered service early this year.
Boeing launched the 787 in late 2003 (outside the decade mark), rolled it out in 2007 and entered service with it in 2013. The 737 MAX was launched in 2011 and is in flight testing. The 777X was launched in 2013; components are in production.
Bombardier launched the CSeries in 2008; it entered service this year, after three years of delays.
Embraer launched the E-Jet E2 om 2013. Flight testing began this year.
New Entrants
These were supplemented by new entrants into commercial aviation: COMAC with its C919; Irkut with the MC-21; and Mitsubishi with the MRJ90. Of these, only the MRJ90 is flying. After more than two years of delays and several false starts, flight testing began in earnest this week at Moses Lake (WA) with FTA-1 (Flight Test Aircraft 1).
Development and new program launches have slowed, but the next decade is hardly going to be idle.
Summary
- Seventeen new aircraft or derivatives are scheduled to enter service through 2020.
- Five potential derivatives might see EIS through the same period.
- Three to five new or potential derivative aircraft might see EIS 2021-2025.
“Scope clauses stop aircraft development”
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
October 16, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: “Scope clauses stop aircraft development.”
The words are those of Rodrigo de Souza, Marketing manager of Embraer Commercial Aircraft when we spoke at the sidelines of the recent ISTAT conference in Barcelona.
De Souza made the comment when we discussed how the new E-Jet E175-E2 would fit with US scope clauses. It doesn’t.
Figure 1. Embraer’s E175-E2, which gives an 11% improvement in fuel burn (the additional 5% is from 76 seats going to 80). Source: Embraer.
The problem is the limit on Maximum Take-Off Weight (MTOW).
“I can understand the other restrictions of a scope clause but not the Max Take-Off Weight restriction,” de Souza said. “It doesn’t make any sense; it just stops new and more efficient aircraft getting into the market. What relevance does it have in protecting mainline pilots from the regional operators taking over routes?”
Summary:
- The MTOW part of scope clauses hits all regional manufacturers.
- Embraer is not the worst hit; their present E175 is compliant and selling well.
- Mitsubishi is worse off. Its entire backlog of 240 MRJ90 is non-compliant. And some of its major customers fly for airlines with scope clauses.
- What is the solution? Why doesn’t scope clauses adapt to modern times?
Engine industry clamoring for road back
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
October 13, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: The airline engine industry is like a ticking bomb. Over the years, a business practice of selling the engines under manufacturing cost and planning to recover costs and make a profit on the aftermarket developed. This goes back decades.
The practice was fostered by fierce competition over the engine contracts for aircraft which offered alternative engines. The losses of the engine sales could be made up later by selling spare parts and services at high margins.
Figure 1. Trent 7000 from Rolls-Royce. Source: Rolls-Royce.
These “jam tomorrow” practices have several implications. The engine industry is now confronted with these and wonder how it could put itself in such a bind. How to handle these and what is the way back?
Summary:
- High competition in engine sales forced ultra high discounts for the up-front engine sale.
- Aftermarket schemes was created that should recover profits over spare parts and services.
- But these maintenance practices create all sorts of problems in the used engine market.
- The engine industry now wants to return to more normal business practices. But how do they find the way back?
Airline assets and lessor assets: Bombardier and Embraer
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Part 2. Part 1 may be found here.
Introduction
Bombardier invented the regional jet. Despite some sales these days, the CRJ was eclipsed by the Embraer J-Jet. Bombardier photo.
Oct. 10, 2016, © Leeham Co.: Regional aircraft are much riskier assets for lessors than mainline aircraft.
Until recently, Bombardier and Embraer were the only two regional jet Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs).
Today, the Sukhoi SSJ100 and the Mitsubishi MRJ90 join BBD and EMB in this arena.
Summary
- Bombardier’s regional jets CRJ series enjoyed a good life with airlines and lessors, but fell into disfavor as fuel prices spiked.
- BBD’s CSeries was ordered by four lessors, but two of them have question marks.
- Embraer’s E-Jet found good homes with lessors, but some worry about supply-and-demand in the secondary market.
Russian-Chinese wide-body: Program responsibilities
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
September 29, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: We will now finish our series about the Russian-Chinese wide-body with looking at who will have what role in the program.
Figure 1. Concept for new wide-body airliner. Source: United Aircraft.
As we described in the initial article, “Background and outlook,” Russia and China have vastly different competencies when it comes to making a state of the art wide-body aircraft.
Russia has made airliners since the 1930s, including wide-body jets. China did not design its own jet aircraft (military or civil) until the mid-1980s. Most of the aircraft produced still today in China have their origin in Russian designs.
At the same time, we saw in the article about the market demand for the aircraft that the Chinese market is 90% of the home market. This makes for China demanding important parts of the aircraft’s production, and China has the money to invest in production facilities.
All this will influence how different parts of the project will be shared between Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC).
Summary:
- Russia and China enter the wide-body project with widely different knowledge bases.
- Russia has long time knowledge on how to develop and produce aircraft and their engines.
- China on the other hand has the market for the aircraft.
- China also know a lot about serial production and have money to invest. Read more
Russian-Chinese wide-body: Aircraft performance
By Bjorn Fehrm
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Introduction
September 19, 2016, ©. Leeham Co: In Part 4 of the article series, we put together an assumed complete Chinese-Russian wide-body aircraft with fuselage, wing, engines, etc. It is now time to understand what kind of performance that can be expected, given the data we have from the wide-body partners, Russia’s United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) and the Commercial Aircraft Corporation of China (COMAC).
Figure 1. Concept for new widebody airliner. Source: United Aircraft.
We will combine these data with the ones we have deduced as plausible to fill the gaps, given the time frame and technology level that UAC and COMAC intend to use.
Out will come a first estimate of what kind of performance such an aircraft can have in terms of efficiency and payload versus range capability.
Summary:
- We can use all the data we have gathered to make a first estimate of the efficiency of the Russian-Chinese wide-body.
- We also have enough information to do a first payload-range diagram and to compare that with the diagram for Boeing’s 787-9.