COMAC C919, first analysis

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Nov. 04, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: COMAC rolled out China’s first modern airliner Monday. We have commented on its place in the market in a sister article. Here we will do a first analysis of its competitiveness compared to the established aircraft in the 150 to 200 seat single aisle segment.

The C919 is an aircraft which resembles another airliner which is assembled in China, the Airbus A320. Many think it is a carbon copy. While many dimensions and solutions are similar, there is enough original thinking on the aircraft to give China credit for having created their own first mainline airliner.

China is going the safe way and staying away from exotic solutions. Designing close to the most modern aircraft in this size bracket is no fault, it’s being prudent. There is no prior knowledge how to do such an aircraft in the country and the A320 is not a bad model. How good is the final result? We do a first analysis with our proprietary aircraft model and check if COMAC’s claim of 5% better aerodynamics than A320 and lower operating costs holds water.

Summary:

  • The C919 has the shape of an A320neo but with more modern nose and wingtips.
  • It is slightly longer than the A320 and has therefore one seat row more in the cabin.
  • COMAC has sensibly stayed with a fully conventional build-up of the aircraft. It has enough on its plate to learn the ropes of getting a mainline single aisle aircraft through flight testing and certification
  • The classical build and slightly larger dimension make for a heavier aircraft than A320neo. We check if its more modern wing can bring the performance past the A320neo benchmark.

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What’s the trouble with Bombardier and the CSeries, Part2?

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Nov. 02, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Bombardier (BBD) held its 3Q 2015 call last week and gave further information around the cash needed to bring the CSeries program to market. We now take the chance to compare our forecast of the program’s costs with the information that could be gleaned from the 3Q report and analyst call.

Overall, it can be said that OEM’s don’t want market analysts to have to detailed information. The answers on the analysts’ questions are as general as possible and one has to collect bits and pieces to build a picture. When doing this, it helps that one has modeled the whole problem beforehand. The OEM’s sparse data points can then be fitted like puzzle pieces into the larger picture and one can see if there is a fit or not.

Here is what we found.

Summary:

  • Overall, the communicated 3Q results and needs of the CSeries program fit well with our forecast.
  • BBD’s CEO, Alain Bellemare, said, however, on Canadian TV that Leeham’s forecast of a loss of $32m per aircraft for the first 50 “is not correct”.
  • With the data that was communicated we have to be close. There is a plausible explanation why we and Bellemare could both be correct; we explain why.

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What’s the trouble with Bombardier and the CSeries?

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Oct. 26, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Bombardier (BBD) and the CSeries have been in the headlines for weeks. The CSeries development has taken longer than planned, with a cost overrun of approximately $2bn. But the company has $4.4bn in cash at end of 2Q 2015. So what is the trouble?

We go through the CSeries program and show the considerable additional cash burden that the start of production and deliveries is for an aircraft program like CSeries. We will get more data on the situation on the 29 October when Bombardier reports its 3Q results.

But it will not be necessary to wait until the 29th. It is rather straight forward to estimate the cash burden the CSeries program has on BBD with the data at hand. The program will burn through billions of cash even after certification and first delivery.

Summary:

  • We analyze the cash position of BBD with the contributors and consumers.
  • We also show the likely production costs of the CSeries aircraft during 2016 to 2018 and compare it to the net revenue that each delivered aircraft will bring.
  • We finally show what has triggered the recent activities around BBD and the CSeries.

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Do the Boeing 787 sums add up, Part 2

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction 

Oct. 22, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: This is an update on our article about Boeing 787 program costs now that Boeing has presented its 3Q 2015 results.

It was a good quarter for Boeing with solid performance in revenue and in cash generation. The results for deferred costs for the 787 program were also above Boeing’s guidance (guidance: same losses as for 2Q), with a $577m increase in deferred costs instead of $790m for 2Q.

Boeing’s CFO, Greg Smith, commented that this result and also gave new values for when the 787 goes cash positive and what the learning effects are for the 787-8 and 787-9. We update our analysis based on these further data points.

Summary:

  • Boeing reports less deferred costs than expected but Greg Smith put this in perspective in his comments. We decode what this means for the deferral curve for the 787.
  • Smith also gave new information regarding learning effects for 787-8 and 787-9 and when the 787 goes cash positive. We check if this changes any of our assumptions in our original article.

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Do the Boeing 787 sums add up?

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Oct. 19, 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Boeing presents its Q3 2015 results on Wednesday. This is a hotly awaited presentation, as analysts then will get another data point in their quest to understand if the 787 program will ever turn a profit.

We believe it is pretty clear that the program will not record an overall profit with the cost of development as well as production costs included. With a development cost of close to $20bn, this is to ask for too much. The question is if the production over the first 1,300 units can turn a profit. This is also under scrutiny.

Boeing employs program accounting for the production phase of an aircraft program and now, 25% into the accounting period for the 787, the accumulated deferred costs are such that it is questionable if future deliveries can compensate.

We take a look at the present state and what Boeing has said about the future. Based on this information, we can deduce if it is probable that Boeing can turn $32bn of deferred cost for the 787 into a profit by 2022.

Summary:

  • We analyze Boeing’s information around its deferred production cost for the 787 and show how many analysts have misunderstood what has been said.
  • Based on the Boeing information, we can deduce the present production cost level, learning curves and when production costs go below the assumed average in the accounting block.
  • We also show what the delivery mix from 787-8 and 787-9 to 787-9 and 787-10 will mean for margins in the program.
  • Finally, we judge whether Boeing will turn the corner on production cost and get the accounting block to a black zero (or better).

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Delta Air sees 777 surplus developing

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Oct. 14, 2015, © Leeham Co.: Delta Air Lines sees a major surplus of young Boeing 777s developing in the near term as key operators plan to let the aircraft go from leases or retirements. The looming surplus makes it more likely that increased pressure on Boeing’s efforts to sell new 777s, and to sell them at reasonable margins, will become increasingly difficult.

Goldman Sachs, the investment bank, sees Delta’s comments as further evidence supporting the likelihood there will be a sharp production rate reduction as early as 2017, perhaps down to six/mo.

Separately, Bernstein Research’s aerospace analyst Doug Harned, also see 777 rates coming down to the equivalent of 6.5/mo in 2017, six in 2018 and five in 2019. The first 777X isn’t scheduled for delivery until 2020, when Harned predicts only five deliveries of the X.

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Analysis: Airbus A350 production and accounting strategy

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Oct. 12 2015, ©. Leeham Co: Airbus is ramping up the A350 program at a rather slow pace. For the first year of production, 2015, it plans 15 deliveries and “a little more than double that” for 2016. Airbus is also introducing “contract accounting” for the first A350 deliveries.

As initial costs for producing a new aircraft model can be 400%-500% higher than the ultimate run-in production cost, Airbus introduces this novel accounting principle to maintain 2015 and 2016 profits “at about the same level.”

We use our aircraft model to understand why Airbus is ramping the A350 as it is and why it uses “contract accounting.” We also show what would be the effects on Airbus profits should A350 not ramp slowly and Airbus use special accounting to keep group quarterly results from surprises.

Summary:

  • The ramp of production of a new aircraft type is extremely expensive. Initial costs exceed what the customer pays for the aircraft with 400%-500%. This can generate company losses if no special actions are taken.
  • We use our aircraft model to show what has been done for the A350 program and why.
  • The wish to have a steady quarterly profit has forced Airbus to use the same accounting practices that is Boeing’s way to keep profits looking good, but with a shorter duration.
  • We explain how this accounting works and what it will mean for Airbus profits.

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Evaluating airliner performance, Part 4

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Oct. 05 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In the final part of our series about comparing and evaluating economic and operational performance of airliners, we will combine the different Cash Operating Costs (COC) with the capital and insurance costs to form the Direct Operating Costs (DOC).

We will also look at typical values for the different costs that make up the DOC for a single aisle Boeing 737 or Airbus A320 aircraft and a typical dual aisle Boeing 787 or Airbus A330neo aircraft.

Summary:

  • We describe the cost that form an aircraft’s capital costs and how these differ between an ownership or a lease model.
  • When forming the Direct Operating Cost (DOC). The low fuel price of $1.50 per US Gallon has lowered the fuel’s part of DOC to around 20% for single aircraft and 30% for dual aisle aircraft on their typical mission types.
  • This means that other costs types in the DOC gets a more dominant role. We show which are the costs to look out for.
  • Finally we give the typical CASM (Cost per Available Seat Mile) values for single and dual aircraft in the market.

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Assessing the China market

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Introduction

Sept. 30, 2015, (c) Leeham Co.: The Boeing deals announced last week with China put the country into the spotlight about its commercial aviation ambitions.

For many, the various deals announced by Boeing raise alarm bells. For most, that fire horse already left the fire station. The smoke has been billowing out of China (or maybe that’s smog) for a long, long time.

Summary

  • Boeing announces 300 orders and commitments for China, though the company was vague about the details. We try to dissect what’s real and what’s smoke.
  • Additional deals announced by Boeing are driven by China’s pay-to-play approach to business.
  • Other OEMs, suppliers also have to pay-to-play.
  • China’s deals with Airbus and Boeing are only two elements of a national goal for commercial aerospace.
  • IP theft and technology transfer big concerns.

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Evaluating airliner performance, Part 3

By Bjorn Fehrm

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Introduction

Sep. 28 2015, ©. Leeham Co: In the third part of our series about comparing and evaluating economic and operational performance of airliners, we will take a deeper look at how the cabin configuration can affect the evaluation result.

Airlines around the world show the operational performance and cost in many different formats. One of the more important is cost per transported passenger or per seat, such as operating cost per available seat mile (CASM). Cost per seat mile is also one of the key results of an aircraft evaluation.

To reach this number, the costs per flown aircraft mile is divided by the seat count of the aircraft. This is the reason why all OEMs try to cram as many seats as possible in their reference aircraft. In evaluations, they use any wiggle room in the evaluation specification to get their seat number up.

To make true apples-to-apples aircraft evaluations, it is therefore necessary that one understand where the OEMs cut corners in their cabin layouts if allowed so that one can hand them evaluation criteria that enables unbiased evaluations.

Summary:

  • We look at the most common methods for the OEMs to increase their seat counts.
  • We learn how to specify the different areas of the cabin to enable fair comparison configurations.
  • Finally, we discuss how much differences in cabin layout can affect a final result in an aircraft evaluation.

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