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By Bjorn Ferhm and Vincent Valery
Nov. 26, 2020, © Leeham News: After analyzing the three members of the Dreamliner family on several routes out of San Francisco to Asian destinations, we conclude the series with a wrap- up of what we learned.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
November 19, 2020, © Leeham News: Last week, we compared the economics of the 787-10 to the 787-9 on the San Francisco to Sydney route.
We could see this 6,500nm route does not suit the 787-10, even though it’s within the aircraft’s range capability. The 787-9 is the better alternative.
We now compare the aircraft on the 4,500nmm San Francisco to Tokyo route, a distance that should suit the 787-10 better.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
November 12, 2020, © Leeham News: We look deeper at the 787-10, the stretched Dreamliner. The 787-10 was conceived as a “cut and stretch” of the 787-9, leaving as many parts untouched as possible. It carries 40 more passengers, but over a shorter distance.
It’s a high capacity complement to the other Dreamliners for airlines that needed more seats and could sacrifice about 1,500nm in payload-range performance. To check how well this works, we run the 787-10 against 787-9 on the San Francisco to Sydney route from last week and look at the data.
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Nov. 5, 2020, © Leeham News: After analyzing the 787-9, we now turn our attention to the last Dreamliner variant that entered into service, the -10.
The 787-10 was developed as a minimum change stretch of the 787-9. Keeping it at the same gross weight as the 787-9 meant it could share the same wing and landing gear, yet offer a higher capacity. The longer fuselage meant higher empty weight and drag so the range of the -10 was cut compared with the other Dreamliners.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
October 29, 2020, © Leeham News: We look deeper at the 787-9, the most successful member of the Dreamliner family. It’s 50 seats larger than the 787-8 but shares the same wing dimensions and engines.
The 787-9 quickly overtook the smaller 787-8 in sales and deliveries once its performance was clear to the airlines.
By following on the 787-8 it could benefit from many enhancements in design and production, becoming a very efficient aircraft in the process. To check its efficiency we run the 787-9 against its predecessor, the Boeing 777-200ER, on the San Francisco to Sydney route and look at the data.
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Oct. 22, 2020, © Leeham News: After analyzing the 787-8, we now turn our attention to the following Dreamliner variant that entered into service, the -9.
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By Bjorn Fehrm
October 15, 2020, © Leeham News: We look deeper at the 787-8, the smallest member of the Dreamliner family. After selling well initially, it has fallen out of favor with the airlines.
We analyze why by comparing it with its more successful sister, the 787-9. The 787-8 and -9 were conceived together, with the -8 as the first birth to be quickly followed by a longer version, the 787-9.
With the troubles of the program, it took three years before the longer 787 was ready. By then it was in many ways a different aircraft than the 787-8.
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
Oct. 8, 2020, © Leeham News: The Dreamliner program is approaching its 1000th delivery less than 10 years after entry into service. It is the fastest-ever delivery ramp-up for any twin-aisle program.
However, the milestone will feel bittersweet due to the upcoming production rate cuts (to six per month from 14) and the decision to close the Everett final assembly line and concentrate final assembly to South Carolina.
As outlined several times before, air travel recovery in the aftermath of the COVID-19 outbreak will take years. Long-haul markets, which the 787 serves, should be last to return to normal.
The above means Boeing will deliver far fewer 787s over the next five years than it envisioned at the beginning of the year. Any significant upgrade of the aircraft is off the table for the foreseeable future. To boost sales and profitability, the American OEM is looking at how to improve its product line at minimal costs.
LNA published an article last month about Boeing’s study into lowering 787-8 production costs.
By the end of August 2020, Boeing had 48, 333, and 145 outstanding orders for the -8, -9, and -10, respectively. LNA estimated the total to be 38, 299, and 145, respectively, after adjusting for orders at risk.
We will, in our series, go through the different models in the product line, their history, and potential for further improvements now that the product line approaches midlife.
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By Scott Hamilton
Aug. 24, 2020, © Leeham News: Research and development spending at Boeing Commercial Airplanes declined 21% in the first half this year compared with 2019.
From 2017 through 2019, BCA’s R&D spending declined 13%.
During the first half this year, Airbus Commercial airplanes R&D spending declined 1%. From 2017-2019, R&D spending increased 31%.
Boeing’s decline in 2019 vs 2018 and the first half of 2020 vs 2019 clearly reflects the grounding of the 737 MAX.
The flat spending in 2017-2018 reflects Boeing’s corporate approach of keeping R&D spending level while returning 100% of free cash flow to shareholders.
Airbus, on the other hand, was aggressively pursuing green aviation R&D, driven by a European Union that is more dedicated to green aviation than the USA is.
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By Vincent Valery
Introduction
May 14, 2020, © Leeham News: Last week, we compared the economics of the Boeing 777-300ER and 777-9 on the world’s busiest intercontinental route. The older aircraft proved a viable alternative, thanks to low fuel prices and low capital costs. We will now turn our attention to the step-down case mentioned in the article.
We will look at the market developments in the twin-aisle market and compare the economics of the 777-300ER with the 787-10 on the JFK to London Heathrow route to find out how attractive such an option is.